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Abstract
Destruction of cultural heritage sites and museums in the Middle East has become
increasingly prevalent in the recent decades. This thesis aims to unravel the causes for these violent
acts. It uses a socio-historical perspective of how culture, religion, and politics have polarized
people and contributed to the ruination. Three museums are examined through a scope of
progressive violence: The Kuwait National Museum, The National Museum of Iraq and the
National Museum of Afghanistan. This thesis shows that both secular and religious factors have
contributed to this destruction, and faults by international governing agencies and of investment
of mitigation strategies are the causes for what came about. The research also presents ideas on
what can be done to improve present circumstances.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In recent years the atrocities that have occurred to cultural heritage in the Middle East
have been the most heinous events that have happened in recent history. The violence that has
been targeted towards cultural heritage sites and museums has occurred on an unprecedented
scale over the last three decades. Museums have been ransacked and burned, while
archaeological sites have been looted and blown up in the heart of the important centers of
human development. The atrocities have caused people to ask: how could this happen? It seems
all too common that this is said yet history repeats itself, though we have not initiated the plans
to combat this. Protecting cultural heritage is one of the most vital and important aspects of
civilization. The British Council says “Societies have long sought to protect and preserve their
cultural heritage, for reasons ranging from education to historical research to the desire to
reinforce a sense of identity. In times of war and conflict, cultural identity and cultural heritage
become more important. Buildings, monuments and symbols of culture that speak of shared
roots acquire an increased significance.”1 The destruction of these heritage sites and museums
has an effect that reverberates on all cultures.
The term “Cultural Heritage” has a multi-layered definition according to United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The definition includes tangible
and intangible heritage Tangible cultural heritage covers movable items including paintings,
sculptures, coins and manuscripts. Immovable tangible heritage includes artifacts such as

Stephen Stenning, “Destroying cultural heritage: more than just material damage”,
https://www.britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/destroying-cultural-heritage-more-just-material-damage,
(August 21, 2015)
1
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monuments and other products of structural achievements of humans. Intangible heritage
includes oral traditions, performing arts and rituals that are at greater risk of being lost to living
populations during conflicts. As items that are vital to cultural identity and belonging, they can
become targets of violent and oppressive action that seek to destroy the symbols or iconography
associated with alternative faiths and traditions.2 This definition stems from The Hague
Convention of 1954, which introduced the term "cultural property" for the first time in an
international agreement and defined the term broadly enough to encompass a wide range of atrisk property. The convention defines cultural property to include both movable and immovable
property as well as the buildings and monuments that house such property. Additionally, the
definition includes "centers containing a large amount of cultural property," meaning that cities
or sections of cities that contain multiple examples of cultural property are to be considered
cultural property themselves.3 The convention and definition are intended to protect the cultural
identity of the people within the conflict as well as relevant material culture that is vital to selfidentity.
Museums and cultural heritage sites have the responsibility of upholding cultural identity;
they have become the victims of war in the Middle East in recent years by vicious religious
extremist groups as well as warring parties. Most recently the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), has been leading one of the most destructive campaigns against cultural heritage sites
though ethnocide and destabilization of a region. Other conflicts that are to blame for this havoc
include the Iranian Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, Persian Gulf War, Lebanese Civil War and the

2

Ibid.
Harvey E. III Oyer, The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict - Is It Working - A Case Study: The Persian Gulf War Experience, 23 Colum. VLA J.L. &
Arts (1999), 52.
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Afghan Civil War/Taliban, which have left many Middle Eastern countries robbed of
their tangible, intangible and immovable cultural objects.
Sparked by the fall of Western-backed colonial powers’ influence and the struggle for
cultural identity in emerging nations behind ethnic and religious tension, these conflicts have
since reached a head. Revolutions and instability have been the center point of conflict for
almost 50 years, yet the global community has lacked the power to enforce rules set forth to
protect heritage. This thesis examines three prominent museums in the Middle East Region; The
Kuwait National Museum, The National Museum of Iraq, and National Museum of Afghanistan,
which have experienced severe destruction to their collections due to armed conflicts. It aims to
unravel the causes for these violent acts and how museums can protect themselves.

Geography
The discussed regions can be placed in the scope of historical and regional importance.
Iraq and Kuwait encompass most of what was ancient Mesopotamia where agriculture, writing,
and urban settlements developed around 3100 B.C. This historical region is located in Western
Asia situated within the Tigris–Euphrates river system that empties into the Persian Gulf. The
region historically has been the subject of colonial, and more recently, neo-imperial interests that
have wreaked havoc on the region. As shown in figure 1, the two countries have many open
areas that are often either deserts or dry flatlands. Most of the populations are urban along the
Tigris- Euphrates rivers or in Kuwait, at the mouth of ports of the Persian Gulf.

3

Figure 1: Iraq and Kuwait in relation to each other.
Afghanistan's geography is starkly different. On the border of the central Asian steppes
and the high-altitude Hindu Kush mountain region, the country is very mountainous and
inaccessible for parts of the year due to the rough terrain. Looking at Afghanistan as a whole, the
western region is less mountainous than the rugged eastern provinces of the country. As seen in
figure 2, the capital city Kabul, is in the eastern portion of the country. The city of Kabul is seen
more in focus in figure 3 with the National museum of Afghanistan located in the southern
neighborhood of Darulaman.

4

Figure 2: Geography of Afghanistan with major cities

Figure 3: City map of Kabul, Afghanistan with points of interests and neighborhoods
5

Iconoclash vs. Iconoclasm
Museum professionals in the Middle East must consider Islamic extremism, especially
as it spreads across the world wreaking the same havoc as it has in the region. This threat has
presented itself in two ways, as Iconoclash and as Iconoclasm. These two definitions are
important to differentiate as they represent different threats to cultural heritage in Muslim lands
during conflict. Applying this understanding is key to fighting the wave of Islamic extremism as
demonstrated in Afghanistan and parts of Iraq. Without acknowledging these principles to
disaster planning in museums, the effects on cultural heritage will have long lasting and
irrevocable damage.

Iconoclash
Combining this conflict of images and history together, a new definition created by
Bruno Latour called Iconoclash sums up what is happening. Iconoclash is characterized as the
contemporary and perpetual image wars in the public sphere, both destructive and constructive,
and driven by advanced technologies of capitalist hypermodernity, new media mobilization, and
the global economy, and of the extensive consumption and regeneration of violent imagery.4
This definition characterizes the impact that certain groups in the Middle East such as the
Taliban, al Qaeda and ISIS are having on cultural institutions. Iconoclash also reflects
characteristics that have allowed terrorist religious organizations to be so volatile when it comes

Bruno Latour, “What is Iconoclash? or Is there a world beyond the image wars?” In Iconoclash, Beyond
the Image-Wars in Science, Religion and Art, edited by Peter Weibel and Bruno Latour, (Cambridge:
MIT, 2002), pp. 14-37, 2002,16.
4
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to many aspects of their practices. Most importantly, their attitudes and beliefs to the destruction
of cultural heritage and artifacts when compared to their actions relate to the convoluted nature
in which they attack cultural heritage. Iconoclash also reflects a struggle of interpretation and
power. Historically, iconoclastic actions have also been used as a political strategy to counter the
powerful memory of a political power. An example of this would be the erased faces of Egyptian
Queen Hatshepsut’s mortuary temple complex at Deir el Bahari.5 This practice can be seen as a
simple act that rarely involved the complete breaking of idols and imagery, rather, they have
involved the mutilation of the dangerous component6 that challenges current rhetoric. In
Hatshepsut’s case, the political legacy that she left by her tomb and statuary challenged the
legitimacy of her successor, Thutmose III, whose dissent towards her led him to try to erase her
rule. This example is very similar to why the National Museum of Iraq was looted. The museum
was targeted because it represented Saddam Hussein’s power and was used to support his
legitimacy as a ruler. Instead of stealing items many things were destroyed or ransacked,
including the museums offices and archives. The mundanity of destruction is the clue for using
Iconoclash to describe the type of destruction. During the war, many government buildings
including the National Museum were attacked to show disdain for Saddam’s Baathist
government. These actions are seen to greatly challenge an existing power or ideal and can
include the destruction of artifacts but not with the same reason or conviction as iconoclasm.
Iconoclash can also be described as an action taken for refuting power because of conflict. In
Latour’s theory, the belligerent is digging for the origin of an absolute – not a relative –
distinction between truth and fallacy, between a pure world, absolutely emptied of human-made
intermediaries.7
Ömür Harmanşah, "ISIS, Heritage, and the Spectacles of Destruction in the Global Media," American
Schools of Oriental Research 78, no. 3(2015): 176.
6
Ibid, 176.
7
Latour, “What is Iconoclash? or Is there a world beyond the image wars?” 25.
5
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Conversely, Iconoclasm is driven by doctrine and the establishment of an ideal
personification of a perception. An example is demonstrated by the Afghan people and the war
that has raged on for years. In the iconoclash of cultural heritage there are multifaceted social
issues that compound the problem, both direct and indirect consequences of several decades of
war and social upheaval. A whole generation of Afghans, for instance, were largely deprived of
an education that encompassed knowledge and respect for the cultural heritage of their
homeland. For these people, refugees and the ongoing Afghan migration, the connection
between identity and history was fragmented or bound to notions of political, ethnic and tribal
affiliation in the more immediate context of war, rather than in a sense of national unity derived
from a universally-owned heritage and history.8 These reasons give a non-binary approach to
looking at this type of conflict in contrast to an Iconoclasm.

Iconoclasm
Religious Iconoclasm as a tradition of many monotheistic religions is the first step to
understand the problems with organized attacks on art. This belief system is where the adherents
reject religious icons representing figures from the religion because they consider it blasphemous
for them to be portrayed. This is because the icon is felt to reflect physical attributes or value
when representing an image that is unholy or heretical. The ideology is understood as a
historically pervasive tactic in the secular religious sphere and for removing the intimacy agency,
effective power, and present liveliness of images and is attested in the history of all monotheistic

Brendan Cassar and Ana Rosa Rodríguez-García, “The Society for the Preservation of Afghanistan’s
Cultural Heritage: An Overview of Activities Since 1994,” in J. Van Krieken-Pieters (Ed.), Art and
Archaeology of Afghanistan: Its Fall and Survival: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach, (Brill Academic
Publishers: 2005) 17.
8
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religions , not just Islam.9 Another term relating to imagery in Islam is Aniconism. This concept
takes a broader definition than Iconoclasm in visual representations of religious icons and nature
in the religious sphere of art. These components are completely absent in art and architecture
associated with an aniconistic group such as Islam. Using these two different terms, Islam wholly
encompasses Aniconism in all its art and architecture which promotes Iconoclasm. This ideology
has led to the way images are interpreted in terms of having power, such as idolatr,y especially in
eyes of ISIS.
These religious dogmas have been the most complex and conflicting in the religion of
Islam. Islamic decorative art in religious spaces from the founding of the religion in the 7th
century A.D have been generally absent of imagery. Rather, they have adhered to a tradition of
artistic expression through complex geometrical art and calligraphy that has adorned religious
spaces. This mentality is thought to have
originated from the Prophet Muhammed's
times. Currently, Bedouin Arabs did not have
a solid tradition of figurative art and were
polytheistic. Like other places in the Near
East, religious veneration was directed at nonsculpted stones.10 The story of the founding of
Islam also states that Muhammad went to the
Ka'ba in Mecca and destroyed the idols of the
polytheistic religions. One of the main

Figure 4: Byzantine Iconoclasm, Chludov
Psalter, 9th century

9

Josh Ellenbogen and Aaron Tugendhaft, Idol Anxiety. (Stanford University Press, 2011): 76.
Silvia Naef, "Is Islam Iconophobic? The attitude of religion and culture toward figurative images in
Islamic Lands," Hadeeth ad-Dar: The Journal of Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah 26 (2008): 43.
10
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supporting factors of all the iconographic prejudice is a Quranic verse which is usually referred
to regarding figuration, in Sura 5:90. This passage calls on believers to stay away from holy
stones venerated by the Arabs before Islam.11 This passage from the Quran has set the stage for
a radical interpretation that has had destructive outcomes. These outcomes lead to Islamic
fundamentalism of the destruction of cultural heritage sites stated by Salafi ideology which
places great importance on establishing Tawhid (monotheism) and eliminating Shirk
(polytheism). Thus, what was seen at the Afghanistan museum is a new added threat to
museums in the region as conflicts rage on.
This type of threat is greater in a sense than that of traditional warfare such as what
happened in Kuwait and in some ways Iraq. In Kuwait, items were stolen, kept, and protected as
a form of war booty. There was no intent of destroying the collection based on idealism or
religious fanaticism. Moreover, it was a form of theft because of personal charisma of Saddam
Hussein and an attempt to reunify with Kuwait. While in Iraq, items were looted or destroyed
under the auspices of rebellion of the old government and the value of marketability of the
objects. In analyzing the cases of Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is an evolution occurring
in the way that armed conflict is affecting cultural heritage. What could have been personal
motives, to motives of ethnic conflict, had transformed into religious tensions. Because of this,
tensions and conflicts are not based on nationalistic or ethnic tensions, but rather religious
motivations.
These two definitions reflect the social and religious conflicts that have thrown the
Middle East into chaos and that have led to bad outcomes for the cultural heritage of the region.

11

Silvia Naef, "Is Islam Iconophobic? The attitude of religion and culture toward figurative images in
Islamic Lands," 43.
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Although, as learned from the lessons from the case studies, there is an underlying powerful
cause affecting the stability of museums and cultural heritage in the Middle East that needs to be
understood in order to protect museums.

Conflict analysis for Museums
To identify the underlying motivations for the destruction occurring to museums in the
Middle East in the last thirty years, context as well as comparison is used. By understanding core
problems of current and past conflicts, we are able to determination how different scenarios have
contributed to different outcomes for cultural heritage, especially museums in the Middle East.
This destruction can be seen through variations of armed conflict in the three cases as either
Secular Armed Conflict or Religious Armed Conflict. These antagonists directly or indirectly
target museums and cultural heritage sites in different ways. Developing a methodology as the
basis of context in understanding, assists with developing a model tht may predict future threats.
As a starting point, there are two types of antagonistic threats in all three case studies of secular
and religious armed conflict that can be understood as being iconoclastic in nature as well as
opportunistic. From this place, it can bifurcate into a secular or religious tendency whose goals are
nationalistic in nature. Two examples that tie this together would be: the destruction
of artifacts and heritage sites in Afghanistan as an extent of theocratic nationalism, and the
looting of the National Kuwait Museum by Iraq as a means of destroying national identity of the
Kuwaiti people. These causes are also opportunistic because in the case of Afghanistan, the
National Museum of Afghanistan was an unintended victim of a multiyear civil war. In Kuwait's
case, it is an opportunity to gain cultural artifacts. These examples

11

share similar tendencies in that through secular and religious conflict are the
underpinnings of ethnic identity and shared cultural history. This ethnic identity can take
different forms and reflect different objectives. Such things as ethnic tension plays out in mass
destruction regardless of attacking a nationalistic identity because the sense of nationality is
absent. The absence negates the use of nationalism to define cultural identity because the
dedication to the ethnic group is stronger than a unifying cultural distinctiveness within a state.
Thus, using this definition to describe a secular conflict two outcomes to the destruction of
cultural property plays out.
These outcomes manifest themselves in being either unintended destruction or
purposeful. Unintended often happens during a conflict to assert dominance over another group.
An example would be the destruction of religious cultural institutions such as mosques in Iraq
during the mid-2000s due to secular conflict between Sunni and Shia religious Muslim subgroup
in Iraq. At his time a sectarian conflict broke out between Sunni and Shia Iraqis during the U.S
led occupation of Iraq where many mosques and other cultural sites important to both sects were
damaged. Another would be the initial destruction that occurred to the National Museum of
Afghanistan during the civil war in the early 1990s. The power struggle that resulted from the
fall of a Soviet backed Afghan government led to tribal warfare where the museum ended up
being burned.12 Cultural sites are in the way of the conflict rather than being a target. Reasons
often include being a strategic advantage or base points for armed operation of military groups as
well as a target. This can also be seen with the destruction of the spiral minaret of Samarra in
Iraq, built by Caliph al-Mutawakil in the 9th century. In 2005, insurgents blew up the top section
of the 162-ft. tower because it was being used by U.S. soldiers as a lookout position in

12

Nancy Hatch-Dupree, "Museum Under Siege," 40.
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the Iraq War.13 The resulting damage of being in the middle of conflict zones heightens the
chances of destruction to sites. Additionally, destruction of material culture can also be done in a
very purposeful way as the result of iconoclastic intentions by the aggressor. These intentions are
used to destroy the identity of the of the non-belligerent by targeting cultural symbols used as
unifying representations. Aggressions can be manifested through this example as in the attack
on the Kuwait National Museum/Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah collection, and attacks on the National
Museum of Afghanistan after the establishment of the Taliban. Another example is a separate
secular iconoclasm in the looting and destruction that occurred at the National Museum of Iraq
and subsequent other looting to Iraqi cultural institutions after the Persian Gulf War. The actions
used in these situations are starkly different from religious iconoclasm and in result a product of
Iconoclash.
Regardless of what type of conflict is occurring, there is little to nothing that can be done
until stability is returned. Conflicts can go on for an indeterminable amount of time that can
prevent access to collections. This is because of the danger war-stricken areas pose as
well as the inability to secure such sites from threats such as generalized looting. These situations
result in national instability that limits the amount of oversight of the amount of damage being
done. A governing body such as the Directorate-General of Antiquities & Museums (DGAM) of
Syria or SBAH of Iraq, have limited capacity to control and protect these sites. Concurrently,
these conflicts also lead to the inability of museum staff to appropriately guard collections from
damage because of the threat to their own lives. Alternatively, global cultural preservation
organizations such as UNESCO, INTERPOL, and others can't help either because of the same

Joris Kila, “Inactive, Reactive, or Pro-Active? Cultural Property Crimes in the Context of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies 1,
no. 4 (2013): 328.
13
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threat. This inability to protect institutions and heritage sites is the main reason the destruction of
museum collections has exacerbated.

Religious Armed Conflict
In the context of the Middle East, armed religious conflicts have plagued countries and
have had disastrous effects on cultural heritage. In understanding the types of attacks that can
occur on museums a religious armed conflicts can be more disastrous than a secular
armed conflict. In comparison, a secular military has been shown to have more organization when
targeting cultural heritage compared to religious led conflicts. Religious Armed Conflicts (RAC)
can be considered more personally motivated by religion and is more individualized than a
nationalistic secular conflict. RAC has an endpoint of the installation of their beliefs and
changing history to fall within their rhetoric and legitimize rule. This leads to further destruction
to what is perceived as a “religious wrong” in times of religious ignorance such as with the
Islamic State group and others such as seen with the Taliban. These groups use items of former
national identity, something museums emulate, to delegitimize the rule of the former to establish
their own identity through religious teachings.
This causes cultural and heritage institutions to be targeted and used as scapegoats to
promote political and religious ideology. Places such as museums and historical sites are
targeted because of the legitimacy they hold within the culture. Destruction of these sites are
very purposeful. In comparison to secular conflict, not to say that they are not targeted, within
the Middle East evidence has shown that often these sites happen to be in the way of fighting
rather than being direct targets. Instances such as the Islamic State attack on the Mosul Museum
and the destruction of the cultural heritage site of Nimrud in Iraq and Palmyra in

14

Syria are evidence of this. Their motivations were driven from the conflict their groups regime
had with iconoclasm and their interpretation of Islam. Because of this the outcomes to the
were disastrous and irrevocable to heritage sites in Iraq, and Syria archeology and museums.
Furthermore, it can be shown that a religious armed conflict can be more disastrous to
artifacts and historical sites that a secular armed conflict to this region. These are a resulting
action of ethnocide that result in the destruction of the history of indigenous people.
As defined by UNESCO in "Declaration of San Jose":
“Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit
its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually. This involves an
extreme form of massive violation of human rights and, in particular, the right of ethnic groups
to respect for their cultural identity.”14
Deliberate in nature, religious armed conflicts can be more terrifying than a secular
armed conflict. By defining and isolating types of conflict, there can be a better effort to help
save cultural heritage and mitigate damage that can be incurred; as well as predict the severity of
destruction through the belligerent rhetoric. Museum professionals must analyze different
threats to determine how outcomes may play out. By understanding armed conflict, museums
in the Middle East may effectively categorize different threat levels.

14

William Schabas, “Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes.”
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Secular Armed Conflict
With secular armed conflict in relation to cultural heritage in the Middle East, there are
generally different motives for destruction. Secular conflict stems from illegitimate or
legitimate states waring over a reason that involves an invasion, occupation, or political motives.
These groups are also subscribing to an ethnic or nationalistic allegiance than to one based on
religion. In these conflicts, a secular armed conflict can be perpetrated against a religious armed
conflict. This can be seen with Kurdish and Iraqi forces fighting against ISIS. Another example
would be Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.S invasion of Iraq. In these types of conflicts
international governing rules apply for each party to protect cultural heritage which, if abided
by, result in better outcomes. This is demonstrated in detail with the key case studies.
In the case of Kuwait, there was no preparation or evacuation plan executed; the Iraqi Army
immediately secured cultural sites, and took artifacts for the interest of its protection.
In the case of Iraq, the museum took all necessary steps to protect the museum months before
invasion. It had Iraqi government guards for protection. The museum guards however, fled due
to instability and the Iraqi Army occupation. Then the museum was looted and ransacked, and it
was not secured by invading forces for six days. In Afghanistan the conflict is divided: In
1992-1996 secular armed conflict, the museum attempted to save collection by shipping items
out of the country. Then the government destabilized and was unable to protect the museum. The
museum was neglected due to conflict. Between 1996- 2001, in the religious armed conflict
stage of destruction, the museum was targeted by the theocratic Afghani government.
This caused most of the remaining collections to be destroyed as an act of defiance
to the international outcry and as an act of propaganda.

16

Chapter 2: Literature Review
When trying to understand the atrocities that have happened to museums in the Middle
East, contemporary scholars have offered commentary on these issues, but they often lack
suggestions for implementation. These problems are often the result of long-standing conflict
zones that prevent academics from fully analyzing and establishing preventive measures
to combat violence to cultural heritage. From an academic perspective, many of the writings
on the destruction to museums and cultural heritage in the Middle East are placed in three
genres. They are either commentaries on the inefficiency of international law, reactionary, or
firsthand accounts from Western museum professionals entering regions after conflicts have
started.
In the article "The Prosecution of War Crimes for the Destruction of Libraries and
Archives during Times of Armed Conflict”15, Sanja Zgonjanin often cites John Henry
Merryman’s article "The Prosecution of War Crimes for the Destruction of Libraries and
Archives during Times of Armed Conflict” as a pivotal scholar within the field relating to the
discussion of the legal ability to protect heritage in times of war. According to Merryman’s
article “Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property,”16 the 1954 Hague Convention was “the
first universal convention to deal solely with the protection of cultural property and appears to
incorporate the international responsibility”17 by an earlier resolution in the Article 28 of the
Nuremberg trials. In this article Merryman dissects the 1954 Hague Convention as solidifying
other protocols built as a result from World War I and World War 2. Merryman also discusses

Sanja Zgonjanin, “The Prosecution of War Crimes for the Destruction of Libraries and Archives
during Times of Armed Conflict.” Libraries & Culture 4, no. 2 (2005).
16
Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property,” American Journal of International Law
80(1986), 836.
17
Ibid.
15
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the ramifications and origins of the 1970 UNESCO Convention as a form of cultural nationalism.
These conventions discussed by Zgonjanin and Merryman build up the policies and procedures
of global acceptable treatment of cultural heritage during war.
While the Conventions are well intentioned, both authors voice their inability to be
effective. As Zgonjanin stated, “common to all cases of destruction: the failure of the justice
system to prosecute and punish those who are responsible.”18 Other citations are drawn from the
various laws, declarations, and precedents formed for the protection of cultural heritage. These
laws and conventions include; The Lieber Code, The Oxford Manual, Brussels Declaration of
1874, 1899 and 1904 Hague Convention, Nuremberg Trial Rulings, The 1954 Hague
Convention, The 1970 UNESCO Convention, The 1999 Hague Convention 2nd Protocol and the
2015 UN Security Council Resolution 2199. These culminate into the foundations of illegality to
the destruction of cultural property that academic papers cite yet provide nothing regarding
implementation. Both authors have created a cohesive and sound understanding of the
Conventions on cultural heritage.
There are three different types of accounting for cultural heritage destruction that have
been revealed when researching this topic for these cases. Firsthand articles recount what
happened during the conflicts using personal knowledge or research. Reactionary articles try to
surmise what happened and attempt to develop new ways of mitigating. These are often shown
to have the most accurate information. The last is ongoing research during conflicts. This type
produces hypothesis and utilizes different types of commonly unreliable sources such as social
media to determine effects on the heritage around them. When taken together, these

Sanja Zgonjanin, “The Prosecution of War Crimes for the Destruction of Libraries and Archives during
Times of Armed Conflict”, 141.
18
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accounts present a holistic approach to analyzing and understanding the situations unfolding in
the Middle East.

Kuwait National Museum
The literature on specific incidents within destruction of institutions discusses the
ramifications of war. The theft of museum collections by the Iraqi Army at the Kuwait National
Museum was written as a firsthand account in two articles by Kristy Norman.19,20 Both are
excellent primary sources detailing the raiding of the Kuwait National Museum during the
invasion of Kuwait, as well as describing conservation efforts on the return of the stolen items,
especially the Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah collection. These articles reflect the viewpoint of a
conservator working at the museum during the invasion and the accounts of damage to the
museum and collection. Another firsthand account is from Sheikha Hussah al-Sabah, the
daughter of Sabah II, the 11th Emir of the State of Kuwait.21 It is the response of the owner of
the private Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah’s collection to how the items were repatriated in 1998.
For secondary sources the works by BP Montgomery22 and by Bloom and Gould23 discuss
supplementary sources on the topic. Other articles reflect a global reaction of shock to the
systematic destruction and looting of the museum by the Iraqi army through news articles such

Kristy Norman, “The Invasion of Kuwait, and the Subsequent Recovery of its National Museum: A
Conservator's View”, Museum Management and Curatorship, (1997):185.
20
Norman, Kirsty. “The Retrieval of Kuwait National Museum's Collections from Iraq: An Assessment
of the Operation and Lessons Learned.” Journal of the American Institute for Conservation 39, no. 1
(2000):136.
21
Sheikha Hussah al‐Sabah. “Rescue in Kuwait: A United Nations Success Story”. Museum
International, 50 (1998): 38-42.
22
BP Montgomery. “The Rape of Kuwait’s National Memory”. International Journal of Cultural
Property 22, no.1(2005): 61-84.
23
Jonathan M. Bloom, and Lark Ellen Gould. “Patient Restoration: The Kuwait National Museum.”
Saundio Aramco World 51, no. 5, (September 2000).
http://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/200005/patient.restoration-the.kuwait.national.museum.htm
19

19

as those by Bob Drogin24from 1991. These articles portray the acts in a barbaric and opinionated
perspective.
Often articles such as these give a one-sided perspective that characterize the Kuwait
National Museum as a victim. A different side can be shown by the museum professionals that
coordinated the systematic looting and seem to commend them on professionalism and care that
was taken when these artifacts were taken. Harvey Oyer takes that perspective in his article on
cultural property law.25 In one study, Oyer points out contradictory biases that the State Board of
Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH) and Iraqi Army did the right thing by securing and evacuating
the museum. Such articles give a balanced take on contentious issues and must always be taken
in account of an argument.

Iraq
The publication of scholarly articles on the destruction and looting on The National
Museum of Iraq were at the forefront of the global media stage almost as soon as the looting
happened, because the invading army of the United States had a larger media presence in their
actions. Because of this, many of the articles convey harsh criticism atypical to other sources
that deal with the destruction of cultural heritage because of the involvement of the U.S
Government. Compilations such as; Catastrophe! The Looting and Destruction of Iraq's Past
edited by Geoff Emberling and Katharyn Hanson from 2008,26 “The Rape of Mesopotamia:
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behind the looting of the Iraq Museum” edited by Lawrence Rothfield from 200927, and articles
published by news sources, relay concerns by the international community that other cultural
heritage sites never had. These sources also reflect how varied the information can be. Other
sources from The Oriental Institute of Chicago and the United States Government contribute
largely to the research of published works. This demonstrated reasoning and accountability that
other sources did not produce within their accounts of destruction. Colonel Matthew Bogdanos
writes an assessment of what happened using personal experience of overseeing the U.S
military's attempts to reclaim artifacts lost during looting28. Bogdanos wrote many articles on
this topic; most are based on his firsthand experiences. Many of the articles on the destruction
and looting to Iraq's National museum are rich with knowledge, insights and theories to
demonstrate the development of a socio-historical narrative that led up to the event. A prominent
collection of writings in a book edited by Lawrence Rothfield with contributions by McGuire
Gibson, Donny George Youkhanna, and Matthew Bogdanos “The Rape of Mesopotamia: Behind
the Looting of the Iraq Museum”29 and “Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection
After the Iraq War.”30 These compilations tie together the faults of action in protecting cultural
heritage in the Middle East. The contributors hold preeminence in their field and worked
jointly in producing articles on the volatility of antiquities in the Middle East, especially in
Iraq.
In consideration of the implementation of cultural heritage protection, literature on the
topic often reflects a reactionary stance in the wake of destruction and reflects little in the way
27
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of implementation. Three articles in Museum Management and Curatorship Volume 16, Issue
Two31 are a reactionary call to preserve heritage because of the wars of the early to mid-1990s
(Bosnia and Desert Storm). This issue of Museum Management and Curatorship had compiled a
large amount of material that called for better preservation and mitigation methods as a reaction
to the Bosnian Wars (1992-1995) and the resulting and immense destruction to cultural heritage
since WWII in Europe. Written after these wars, plans were made to protect and recover the
destroyed heritage as seen in such articles by Barbara Robert’s “War Emergencies: Coordination
and Preparedness to pay off- An International perspective” 32and in The War and the
Conservator’s: “Preventative Measures and Recovery” by Nicholas Stanley-Price.33 Another
post-war call to action includes Kristy Norman’s publications, “The Invasion of Kuwait, and the
Subsequent Recovery of its National Museum: A Conservator's View” (1997)34 and “The
Retrieval of Kuwait National Museum's Collections from Iraq: An Assessment of the Operation
and Lessons Learned” (2000)35 are another set of responses in the wake of Kuwait's looting
during the Persian Gulf War (1990-91). These articles reflect a reactive response in cultural
heritage academia that give suggestions of change yet lack instances of plans working. These
articles tend to build on each other over the course of twenty years.
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Afghanistan
There is a major gap in academic research on the National Museum of Afghanistan due
to the conflicts and instability plaguing the country over the past 40 years. Nancy Hatch Dupree
was one of the foremost cultural heritage scholars before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
the late 1970s. Among the relevant scholarly articles on Afghanistan's heritage pre-war, Dupree
is noted as a leading academic and had an active role at the National Museum of Afghanistan.
Dupree’s book, “The National Museum of Afghanistan: An Illustrated Guide”36 was one of the
first attempts to publicize and create a partial catalogue of the museum’s collection. Among her
most prominent writings on Afghanistan, the article “Museum Under Siege” 37 is one of her most
important to understand what happened in years immediately following the Afghan Civil War
and prior to the Taliban Regime. This article, in connection with the organization Preservation
of Afghanistan’s Cultural Heritage (SPACH), aided in giving a small assessment of what had
happened to the institution during the civil war and the major damages incurred during that time.
The article also serves as an early attempt to show the damage that was caused during the civil
war before the country was inaccessible under the Taliban. This organization was pivotal in
developing research and protection for the museum. Many of the notable founders contributed
articles to Art and Archaeology of Afghanistan: Its Fall and Survival: A Multi-Disciplinary
Approach38 include; Nancy Hatch Dupree, Carla Grissman, Brendan Cassar, Ana Rosa
Rodríguez-García, and Juliette van Krieken-Pieter through various articles. This compilation is
pivotal in understanding the current situation of Afghanistan's cultural heritage protection.
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By providing an overview of the diversity of activities undertaken in the cultural heritage field, it
aims to change public opinion into a positive one for future scholars to take note of. Other
articles such as Barbara Crossette’s “Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans"39 reflect the inability
of the global community to effectively save the collections from the deleterious actions of the
Taliban government.
After the fall of the Taliban by the U.S Government in 2001, access to the country's
crumbling cultural heritage resources opened, resulting in numerous assessments on the state of
cultural heritage in the country. Contemporary articles have been written by American cultural
professionals who had access to the region under the U.S occupation. These include; “The WarRavaged Cultural Heritage of Afghanistan: An Overview of Projects of Assessment, Mitigation,
and Preservation” 40 by Gil J. Stein and “The Kabul Museum: Its Turbulent years” 41 by Carla
Grissman are assessments of Afghan heritage now that the country is in its most semi-stable state
in over three decades. The articles focus on rebuilding the nation's cultural heritage especially for
the National Museum as archeological sites. The articles "Between Cult and Culture: Bamiyan,
Islamic Iconoclasm, and the Museum" by Finbarr Barry Flood42, “Cultural Heritage Preservation
and Development at the National Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul” by William Remsen and
Laura A. Tedesco43 are pivotal in understanding the toxic attitudes that developed
towards antiques during the Afghan civil war. Through the academic literature, it
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can be shown that stabilization and creation safe spaces for conservators will contribute toward
progress of the short and long-term impact on the Afghan cultural infrastructure.
Of all the major museum institutions within the Middle East, one of the few places that
used a preparedness plan was the Beirut National Museum as told in “Recovery Operations at
the National Museum of Beirut”44 by Isabelle Skaf. Her article reflects how attempts were made
to a save collections and even the movable objects in the collection. Skaf’s article also
demonstrates the implementation of long-term planning for collections under siege for an
indeterminable amount of time. This is something many of the other articles do not incorporate
when discussing planning methods. Consulting sources on the management or preparation such
as “ICCROM Involvement in Risk preparedness”45 by Jukka Jokilehto, international heritage
organizations come across as “Eurocentric”46.
Comparatively, it may take longer for the incidents that occurred to appear within
academic journals and books because the overall destruction has yet to be assessed. Ongoing
conflicts over multiple years or decades such as the Afghan Civil War and the ensuing Taliban
regime do not allow the full scale of the destruction to be known. This perpetuates the lack of
understanding regarding the effects of these wars and the inability for the global community to
help. Yet, the stipulations of the Hague Convention are meant to set rules for how it should be,
yet falters and has no backing until the destruction has already occurred. Still, this remains a long
and tedious task of pinpointing the aggressors of the infractions that seldomly results in charging
those responsible. As said in Preventative Measures and Recovery by Nicholas Stanley-Price47,
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“The number of countries in which museums and archives have been badly damaged as a result
of armed conflict in the 1990s appear to be higher than at any time since the Second World
War”48. This statement reflects the inability of the doctrine set forth within the 1954 Hague and
UNESCO declarations of the 1970s to create any changes as seen in academic literature. More
often they are only mere philosophies and ideals that are called on but do not achieve anything.
As museum professionals we must invest in effective disaster planning for institutions and
collections worldwide.

Mitigation Strategies
In exploring mitigation preparations, UNESCO, the United Nations (U.N.) and the
International Center for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property
(ICCROM), provide rules for mitigation plans. Articles such as ICCROMS’s “Involvement in
Risk Preparedness”49, and UNESCO/ICCROM’s, “Endangered Heritage: Emergency Evacuation
of Heritage Collections”50 provide a basic outline on preparation of museums during threats.
They appear to be more idealistic than practical when using them considering what has happened
in the Middle East. Other papers are reactionary to a specific event such as the disaster at the
Iraqi Museums. Two articles in Antiquities Under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection After the
Iraq War, Col. Bogdanos’s “A Five-Point Plan for Future Action”51 and in Gibson and
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Youkhanna’s “What Cultural Ministers and Heritage Sites Should Do to Prepare for Conflict”52
give solutions to faults during the invasion of the Iraq War and protecting cultural heritage.
While these articles point to progressive policies when militaries are involved in conflict, they do
not reflect the often-unconventional methods of war during a civil war or socio-political
upheaval. These types of conflicts have been increasingly common in the Middle East with
groups such as the Taliban and the Islamic State group. ICCROM’s paper on “Risk Preparedness
and Heritage Management in times of Socio-political Crisis: The role of experts” by Mohammad
Beiraghi in ICCROM: Protecting Cultural Heritage in Times of Conflict53 and Bruno Latour’s
“What Is Iconoclash? or Is There a World beyond the Image Wars?”54 addresses these issues
during socio-political crisis through cause and effect. Using these articles demonstrates how
cultural heritage is the center of destruction during conflict complements the mitigation strategies
put forth in articles of Museum Management and Curatorship55 Volumes and Antiquities Under
Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection After the Iraq War56 series.
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Chapter 3: History of Cultural Property Legislation
The destruction of cultural property and heritage sites is an occurrence that is as old as
warfare. Cultural property destruction is described as erasing ethnic, religious, and cultural
memories to therefore undermine or eliminate groups identified and existence.57 These actions
can be caused by religious beliefs such as iconoclasm as well as non-religious motives which
result in an ethnocide to cultural identity. Iconoclasm is defined as the action of attacking or
assertively rejecting cherished beliefs and institutions or established values and practices or
the rejection or destruction of religious images as heretical. In the past two centuries, attempts
have been made by countries to regulate warfare to avoid such atrocities to one another’s
material culture. Such attempts have culminated into multinational accords that made
standards and rules for the way war is to be conducted and holding violators accountable.
These situations are the guidelines for how cultural heritage should be addressed.
An important step that has influenced much of the cultural heritage planning legislation during
conflicts was initiated during the American Civil War. In 1863 U.S President Abraham Lincoln
implemented the Lieber Code or Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field to the Union Troops. This code imposed how the U.S Army should conduct itself in wartime.
Some of the important laws to cultural heritage protection where set forth in Articles 34 and 36.
Article 34 states “ As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other
establishments of an exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or foundations
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for the promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies of
learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character – such
property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may
be taxed or used when the public service may require it.”58 Article 36 says, “If such
works of art, libraries, collections, or instruments belonging to a hostile nation or
government, can be removed without injury, the ruler of the conquering state or nation
may order them to be seized or removed for the benefit of the said nation. The ultimate
ownership is to be settled by the ensuing treaty of peace. In no case shall they be sold or
given away, if captured by the armies of the United States, nor shall they ever be
privately appropriated or wantonly destroyed or injured”59 . The significance of the
Lieber code, although not always followed, was the influence it had within the global
community to erect standards in the way warfare was conducted. It influenced the need to
enact standards as well as an attempt to protect significant material culture from conflict.
One of the first multinational, Western-backed international cultural property
prevention initiative attempts to define what cultural property was during wartime in the
Brussels Declaration of 1874. This declaration reinforced that cultural property was a
form of private property and therefore established a link between culture and property
ownership.60 “On the initiative of Czar Alexander II of Russia the delegates of 15
European States met in Brussels on 27 July 1874 to examine the draft of an international
agreement concerning the laws and customs of war submitted to them by the Russian
Government.” Although not all the governments ratified the convention, it was an
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effort toward the codification for laws of war and an important start of international
procedures for the protection of cultural heritage. In the year in which it was adopted, the
Institute of International Law, at its session in Geneva, appointed a committee to study
the Brussels Declaration and to submit to the Institute its opinion and supplementary
proposals on the subject.
The efforts of the Institute led to the adoption of the Manual of the Laws and
Customs of War at Oxford in 1880. Both the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford
Manual formed the basis of the two Hague Conventions on land warfare and the
Regulations annexed to them, adopted in 1899 and 1907. The Brussels Declaration notes
that Article 8 of the 1874 Brussels Declaration states: “The property of municipalities,
that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences even
when State property, shall be treated as private property. All seizure or destruction of, or
willful damage to, institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and
science should be made the subject of legal proceedings by the competent authorities.”61
Comparatively, Article 53 of the 1880 Oxford Manual states “The property of
municipalities, and that of institutions devoted to religion, charity, education, art and
science, cannot be seized. All destruction or willful damage to institutions of this
character, historic monuments, archives, works of art, or science, is formally forbidden,
save when urgently demanded by military necessity”.62 Many of the provisions of the two
Hague Conventions can easily be traced back to the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford
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Manual.”63 These declarations were the first attempts to develop a multinational treaty to
ensure the protection of rights to those at war. Yet the greatest atrocities to cultural
heritage lay ahead.
The Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 were greater global attempts. A series of
international treaties and declarations were negotiated at two separate conferences at The Hague
in the Netherlands. These treaties were an attempt to develop multinational standards in the
procedures of war in “civilized” countries. Article 56 of the 1899 Hague Regulations provides,
“The property of the communes, that of religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and
those of arts and science, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. … All
seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done to such institutions, to historical
monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited, and should be made the subject of
proceedings”64
The second convention was proposed by U.S President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 but
was postponed due to the Russo- Japanese War (1904-1905) until 1907. It stated in Article 56 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations provides: “The property of municipalities, that of institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property,
shall be treated as private property. All seizure of, destruction, or willful damage done to
institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and
should be made the subject of legal proceedings”.65 Then World War I arrived, and these
agreements were again ignored and not implemented by all parties. This resulted in a tremendous
loss to the cultural heritage of Western Europe.

63

Ibid.
Practice Relating to Rule 40. Respect for Cultural Property.
65
Ibid.
64

31

Another proponent to creating international awareness of cultural property, The
Roerich Pact, was initiated by a museum at the beginning of World War II. This pact,
signed by twenty-one-nations, was meant to preserve cultural treasures in times of danger
by the designation of objects as cultural treasures. Such objects were to be considered
neutral, unless used for military purposes.66Aspects of the Roerich Pact included in the
protection are historic monuments, museums, and scientific, artistic and cultural
institutions.67 These protections again faltered with Nazi Germany looting and
confiscating countless amounts of cultural heritage from invaded countries. “After World
War II, the judges of the military tribunal of the Trial of German Major War Criminals at
Nuremberg Trials found that by 1939, the rules laid down in the 1907 Hague Convention
were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as declaratory of the laws and
customs of war. Under this post-war decision, a country did not have to have ratified the
1907 Hague Convention to be bound by them.”68 This ruling was critical to the
enforcement of cultural heritage laws and prompted of the major laws to come, the 1954
Hague Convention.
The key international initiative considered to be one of the most all-encompassing
collaborations was created after World War II. It is the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, also known as the 1954 Hague
Convention. This convention prompted another attempt to rectify the recognition of
global character of cultural property, recognition of the need for special legal provisions
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to preserve cultural property, recognition of individual responsibility for crimes against
cultural property, and the extension of jurisdiction to trying such crimes69 by drawing to
previous conventions on war time procedures. As stated in Article 4(3) of the
convention, “The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if
necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of
vandalism directed against, cultural property. They shall refrain from requisitioning
movable cultural property situated in the territory of another High Contracting Party.”70
It bound provisions against buildings, housing, sheltered archives, and literary collections
during conflicts.
Furthermore, The Hague Convention bound the High Contracting Parties to safeguard
cultural property situated in Chapter 1 Article 3, their own territory against “foreseeable effects
of an armed conflict, by taking such measures as they consider appropriate.”71 Thereby, the onus
is on each contracting country to take affirmative steps to protect its own cultural property from
foreseeable wartime damage. As would be expected, The Hague Convention also requires
Contracting Parties to refrain from hostile acts directed against cultural property in their own
territory or within the territory of other Contracting Parties, and to refrain from any use of
cultural property, or areas immediately adjacent to it, that would likely expose it to destruction or
damage. Furthermore, no Contracting Party can evade its obligation to protect another
Contracting Party's cultural property simply because the other Contracting Party has failed to
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properly safeguard its own cultural property.72
This stipulation forces parties involved to protect cultural heritage regardless if one
violates the agreement making the other responsible of protection of sites. Thus, in theory, the
cultural property of a Contracting Party is protected from enemy attack so long as that party
continues to adhere to the provisions of The Hague Convention itself.73 As a reactionary doctrine
that was brought about from WWII, the 1954 Hague Convention was the culmination of every
previous attempt to protect cultural heritage. These provisions falter when belligerents in
conflicts are not bound by agreements or the government that is responsible for protection
specifically targets cultural heritage which results in rampant violations.
A following decree by the United Nations cultural arm, UNESCO, continued to
contribute to what was deemed cultural property by their convention in 1970 by developing The
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property. The convention added manuscripts and incunabula singularly or in
collections. This convention also brought new definitions for sound, photographic, and
cinematographic archives,74 yet with all these conventions to help ensure that cultural heritage
and property remain neutral in conflicts there is no guarantee that the agreements will be
followed or enforced.
This is especially true when conflicts arise, and warring parties ignore these
conventions and more dangerously, are not bound to them. With the cases of the Taliban
and ISIS, they completely reject Western ideals as they are of those of their perceived
enemy, the infidel. In other cases; laws were just ignored such as in the Afghan Civil
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War, very loosely enforced as in the U.S Invasion, or contentiously seen as ignored with
Saddam Hussein in the invasion Kuwait. This convention also bound parties of more
regional conflicts to them as seen in 1954 Hague Article 19(1): “ In the event of an armed
conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.”75 The
convention was added in 1999 following the atrocities of the Balkan Wars of the early
1990s. This was called the Second Protocol to The Hague Convention for the Protection
of Cultural Property and stated in Article 15, “1. Any person commits an offence within
the meaning of this Protocol if that person intentionally and in violation of the
Convention or this Protocol commits any of the following acts: … (e) theft, pillage or
misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against cultural property protected
under the Convention. 2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish as criminal offences under its domestic law the offences set forth in this Article
and to make such offences punishable by appropriate penalties”. 76 While the guidelines
are excellent starting points for the protection of culture, they have been frequently
violated with few examples of repercussions to the violator and even smaller reparations
to the victims. The enforcement of these laws is often left to war tribunals at the Hague
that often take place years after the event, take years to try criminals.
Within the Middle East, no justice has been delivered when cultural heritage laws
are violated. An example would be when in March of 2001, the Bamiyan Buddhas were
intentionally destroyed by an Islamist affiliated group in Afghanistan. The Bamiyan
75
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Buddhas were two 1,700-year-old statues carved into a sandstone hillside in the Bamiyan
region of Afghanistan. The destruction was done by militiamen acting on an edict to take
down the "gods of the infidels.”77 The edict was a product of Mullah Mohammed Omar,
a Taliban leader, who issued the ruling on February 26, 2001 ordering the destruction of
all non-Islamic statues in Afghanistan.
A western observer who witnessed the act said: "They drilled holes into the torsos
of the two statues and then placed dynamite charges inside the holes to blow them up.”
The Taliban considered the statues an abomination from the pre-Islamic “dark ages” that
relate to iconoclasm. We now know that the decision to demolish the Buddhas and all
pre-Islamic monuments and artifacts depicting living beings in the country was the result
of an internal power struggle heavily influenced, if not dictated, by foreign forces, or alQaeda.
More notably are the violations to the Hague and UNESCO conventions
conducted by ISIS in Iraq and Syria which have wiped out countless artifacts and cultural
heritage sites in recent years. In March 2015 ISIS purged the historical site of Nimrud,
capital of the ancient Assyrian empire, founded more than 3,300 years ago. Its frescoes
and sacred texts were celebrated around the world for being well preserved. The
destruction was documented by ISIS; they used sledgehammers and jackhammers to
break down alabaster reliefs before bulldozing the mud brick enclosure. Then they blew
the site up with large barrels of ammunition. In another instance in 2014 ISIS militants
pulverized ancient artifacts, in a Mosul museum after the city was taken. The propaganda
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Figure 5: Buddhas of Bamiyan before and after Taliban destruction

Figure 6: ISIS jackhammering a Lamassu relief (2015)
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video shows them toppling over statuary as well as smashing anything left in the
museum.
The US Department of Defense (DOD) has an obligation, under Section 402 of
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, to protect the heritage property of any
area in the world under the responsibility of the DOD. Failure to take into consideration
heritage property could easily result in the DOD being sued both by U.S. citizens and
possibly in international court78 by The Hague. Yet, when looking at the way the US led
invasion was handled, it could be considered a travesty to cultural heritage as well. As
said by INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization.), “Despite the 1954
Convention and its additional Protocols, the destruction of and trafficking in cultural
properties persisted throughout numerous regional conflicts. Following the new and more
recent forms of aggression and destruction carried out by terrorist groups, the
international community has recognized the need for more forceful prevention and
intervention.”79 This intervention is necessary given the ineffectiveness proven in
carrying out these rulings, especially in the Middle East or other areas of heavy conflict.
These laws are often implemented after the fact rather than trying to enforce them while
such tragedies occur. Often solutions such as the 2015 adoption of resolution 69/281 by
the United Nations called “Saving the cultural heritage of Iraq, stated “the UN General
Assembly deplored the rise in deliberate attacks and threats on the cultural heritage of
countries affected by armed conflicts. A breakthrough was achieved in February 2015
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through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2199, under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. This resolution recognizes that the illicit trafficking of cultural objects can
be used as a source of financing for terrorism and requires Member States to take legallybinding measures to prevent “trade in illegally exported Iraqi and Syrian cultural
property” with the assistance of UNESCO, INTERPOL, and their main partners.” 80
Though these laws are suggested and often are not ratified by their states government
bodies for years or put into place after tragedy has struck.
In the cases of the National Museum of Kuwait, the Iraq National Museum, and the
National Museum of Afghanistan, international protocols did little in the prevention or
persecution of cultural heritage crimes. Because of this, museums cannot completely rely on the
protection of these conventions, but rather learn from past mistakes to solve current threats. To
develop from these past mistakes, an in-depth look into three case studies will be made to
understand the context of the conflict. Using the juxtaposition of varying types of conflict set
forth in the following cases, can the understanding be made to what happened to these
institutions and therefore proper planning can be proposed.
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Chapter 4: Case Studies
Kuwait National Museum
The beginnings of the Kuwait National Museum start on December 31, 1957 when the
museum was first inaugurated. It was then based at the former palace of Sheikh Abdullah AlJaber Al-Sabah in the Dasman neighborhood of Kuwait City. The archaeological discoveries at
Failaka created a requirement for a place to house these important finds and the Department of
Antiquity and Museums bought the residence of the Sabah family in Kuwait City, then turned it
into the national museum.81 In 1976 the collection was transferred to Al-Badr House in
preparation for the establishment of the new, larger museum to be opened later. In 1983, ancient,
Islamic, and popular antiquities were moved to its current home and culturally has its objectives
in the preservation of Kuwaiti heritage and the dissemination of knowledge.82
The present National Museum (KNM) was built in 1983 and was designed by famed
architect Michel Ecochard. At the time of implementation, the complex consisted of five separate
buildings surrounding a center garden court. The institution itself was opened to public in 1986
and divided into four blocks: three for permanent exhibitions and the fourth for administrative
offices and auditorium.83 By 1990, the KNM housed two major collections: The National
Archaeological and Ethnographic Museum, and the al -Sabah Collection of Islamic Art,
otherwise known as Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah Collection. The al-Sabah collection began to
take form in 1975 when Sheikh Nasser Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah purchased the collection’s first
object. It was a mid-14th century enameled glass bottle he found in a London art gallery. At that
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time, the collection started out as a hobby he and his wife Sheikha Hussah Sabah al-Salem alSabah were pursuing, it soon grew to a full-fledged collection worthy of a place in a museum.84
By 1983, as the collection was growing, it had made its way from Sheikh Nasser’s private
residence to its new location at the Kuwait National Museum. The building became known as
Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah (DAI), where Sheikha Hussah became the organization’s director
general.85 The al-Sabah Collection had been assigned a spare building in the complex and the
two collections functioned separately, each with its own staff.86
The Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah Collection had been placed on long loan to the state
under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and were exhibited87 for public viewing. The
al-Sabah Collection within the assemblage, consists of a wide range of important objects, which
include books, manuscripts, ceramics, glass, metal, precious stones and jeweled objects,
architectural ornaments, textiles and carpets, coins and scientific instruments. The objects on
display represent the full chronological and geographic spread of the Islamic world.88 In 1990,
the collection was rated amongst the top six Islamic art collections on public display anywhere in
the world,89 something truly significant to be stolen.
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Background
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq is a multifaceted event that has roots in the shared history
of British imperialism between the two countries. The two countries where both a part of the
Ottoman Empire that, in its declin,e came under the influence of Britain. In 1899 Britain made
the Sheikdom of Kuwait into a protectorate from the Ottoman Vilayet of Basra due to political
turmoil. This embittered Iraq, especially when Kuwait became an independent nation in 1961, a
move that the Iraqi government did not support. Iraq claimed that Kuwait had been created by
British imperialism and that it was, indeed, an extension of Iraq.90 From 1982 until 1988, Kuwait
provided financial support to Iraq during Iran-Iraq War despite violent retaliation from Iranian
forces. In the end, Kuwait’s financial contributions totaled around $14 billion to Iraq. At the end
of the war, relations eventually worsened when Iraq was unable to repay Kuwait and asked for
loan forgiveness. The government of Kuwait was unwilling to forgive the loan.91 Iraq- Kuwait
relations became even more strained over this as Iraq became crippled by its debt.
Amber Pariona stated: “After the Iran-Iraq War ended, the oil minister of Iraq suggested
increasing oil prices as a means of paying off its war financing. Around the same time, Kuwait
increased its oil production. With abundant oil supplies on the market, the price of oil from Iraq
could not be increased. Consequently, the economy of Iraq continued to suffer. Iraq considered
Kuwait’s refusal to reduce its oil production as an act of aggression. This accusation of
aggression was followed by the allegation that Kuwait was drilling for oil in the Rumaila field in
Iraq. Iraq insisted that Kuwait had developed an advanced drilling technique, capable of slantdrilling. According to Iraqi officials, Kuwait’s use of slant-drilling allowed the country to steal

90

Amber Pariona, "Why Did Iraq Invade Kuwait in 1990?" World Atlas. Last modified April 25, 2017.
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/invasion-of-kuwait-why-did-iraq-invade-kuwait.html.
91
Ibid.
42

over $2.4 billion in oil. In 1989, Iraq demanded repayment for the lost oil.”92 Thus, Iraq’s
inability to repay Kuwait back for the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq’s economic instability, and the idea that
Kuwait was an inherent part of Iraq separated by imperialism, instigated the invasion on August
2, 1990. During the initial invasion members of the Ministry of Iraqi Antiquities, The State
Board of Antiques and Heritage (SBAH), came to the Kuwait National Museum and
systematically began packing and shipping all the movable artifacts from the museums back to
Iraq. In February of 1991, as the Iraqis were losing the war, the military burned down the parts of
the museum as they retreated.

Timeline of Events
During the events of the Iraqi invasion in 1990, the Kuwait National Museum and the Dar
al-Athar al-Islamiyyah Collection, respectively, were looted in their entirety by the occupying
Iraqi forces. Among the stolen items were objects from the al-Sabah collection as well as the
entire Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah research library. The only things left in the museum were a
pair of carved 14th century wooden doors from Fez, Morocco.93 Though not immediate, the
process of looting took place over time. This sequence of events began during September
through October of 1990 with the removal of many artworks, books and manuscripts and cultural
objects from museums and private collections of Kuwait by the Iraqis. From Kristy Norman’s
personal account, she stated that “on the first day, guards were posted on all institutions which
the Iraqi government wanted to reserve for its own uses, in order to prevent looting.”94 Then one
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of the Kuwaiti staff of Dar al-Athar went to the museum a few days later, posing as an interested
student, and was asked if she knew where any of the keys were, so at least we knew that the
Iraqis had not even forced an entrance yet. On September 1st, 1990, six weeks after the invasion,
there was news that trucks had been seen outside the museum, and it was speculated that the
collections were being moved north to Iraq.95
At the time, Iraq claimed that the action was necessary under the First Protocol of the
Hague Convention as part of their obligation to protect the cultural objects in occupied
territory.”96 Kristy Norman believed that “The disappearance of the National Museum and Dar
al-Athar al-Islamiyyah collections was not, on the whole, the result of random looting, and this
situation was to be one of the most significant factors in their recovery.” 97 This can be seen with
the meticulousness of how the collection was taken by the Iraqi officials. As stated in a news
article from the L.A Times, “Iraq's seven-month rape of Kuwait's culture and economy was a
grimly efficient affair: What the Iraqis didn't steal, they destroyed. At the Kuwait National
Museum, Baghdad's museum chief personally supervised the work when 17 trucks drove up to
cart off one of the world's best collections of ancient Islamic art.”98 The article also quotes
Colonel Jeffrey Greenhithe, arts, monument , and archives officer for the U.S. Army, stating that
"What (Iraqi President) Saddam (Hussein) did to the people of Kuwait was a crime against
humanity,...But what he did here," [he said, pointing around the fire-gutted museum that once
was a pride of the Arab world,] "was a crime against civilization.”99
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What was lost
In attempts to assess what was lost, The National Museum and the Dar al-Athar alIslamiyyah presented different problems as the two collections were not unified in their
collection accession records. Problems began to arise when the museum tried to establish what
was stolen or lost after the invasion because of the separate collection catalogs. In the weeks
leading up to the invasion, the Iraqis sent staff from their Department of Antiquities to assess and
pack what they wanted from the two collections. Most of the immovable objects were left as well
as many objects such as ethnographic material. It was later revealed that the Iraqis involved had
been working under a deadline imposed by the army and did not have time to take everything.
They were methodical enough, however, and took all documentation for both collections.”100 In
analyzing losses and theft the two major collections were assessed differently.

National Museum’s Collection
Kristy Norman's account for losses states, “The National Museum has not at the time of
writing produced exact figures but estimates that it has lost twenty to thirty percent of its
collection.”101 In actuality, sixty to seventy percent of the National Museum collections was
taken. It was felt that the National Museums collections where difficult to quantify by Norman
because of the inadequate record keeping. At the time of the recovery operation, the material in
Iraq was estimated at about 26,000 objects.102 A major problem of trying to account for
inventory discrepancies was because the National Museum had no records outside Kuwait, or
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indeed at another site inside Kuwait, it could not assemble an inventory for Interpol or as a basis
for the recovery operation in Baghdad.103

Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
The Dar al-Athar al- Islamiyyah collection within the Kuwait National Museum has had a
better accountability of its collections, primarily because it is organized from a private
collection. Kirsty Norman stated that Iraq antiquities professionals were methodical in
documentation for both collections. At the time, Dar al-Athar numbered around 3,000 objects of
varied media and an Islamic art and history library of some 3,000 books, and about 900
additional objects were on display. 104 There was also a library of books, modern and antiquarian,
on Islamic art and the Islamic world. The collection and library were housed in a large modern
building designed to lead the visitor through 10 interconnecting galleries around a spectacular
central atrium in which hung the largest carpets. The objects were presented by period, from preIslamic through to Mughal India. 105 Other parts of the collection were 1,500 major pieces
included two double-pages in Kufic (early Arabic) writing from a 2,000-year-old religious
document, 10th-Century crystal chess pieces, emerald-encrusted Mongol daggers and a lace-like
gold pendant from AD 8. About 2,000 ancient coins and signature stones, some dating 2,500
years before Christ, were highlights.
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Figure 7: Inside Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah (DAI) at the Kuwait National Museum.

Figure 8: The Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah at Kuwait National Museum Post-Invasion 1990.
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The items that make up the twenty to thirty percent of what was known to be destroyed at
the museum were items left behind by the Iraqi Antiquities authorities. These objects suffered
the most dramatic damage because they were on display; they had no ready-made packaging or
supports because they were deemed too large or immovable. The Iraqis were able to pack smaller
objects with paper in tin trunks, but larger objects received little or no protection. The one large
rug still out on display, a 17th-century medallion Ushak carpet, was rolled on itself, folded twice,
and then trussed tightly with rope for the trip to Iraq in an open truck106 which heavily damaged
it. Other objects that were left in the museum to suffer damages were the pair of 14th-century
Moroccan wooden doors, standing at 3.5 m tall. The Iraqi Department of Antiquities staff had
been unable to move them, and they were burned with the museum several months later. The
door’s metal fittings were found in the ashes, they were among the collection's great pieces.107
Some other items that where lost was “Hellenic columns and statues dating to Alexander the
Great, and three ornate Arab pottery urns, had their own gallery. So, did gilt-embroidered
Kuwaiti dresses, and delicate ancient lyres and other musical instruments.”108 Few of the
museum’s collections were safe with about only a hundred items being on loan to other
institutions which were primarily in Russia. At the time of the invasion, Kristy Norman assisted
in overseeing a traveling exhibition was being sent to Russia and around the world. This
exhibition was made up of 114 of the most important objects from the collection109 and was well
documented for the trip.
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Significance of what was lost
The significance of the looting that occurred in the Kuwait National Museum during the
Iraq invasion and Desert Storm war can be separated into two instances; looting and burning.
The removal of artifacts is evidence of how Iraq’s antiquities authorities quickly acted to secure
and relocate the museum’s collection in what is interpreted as well organized and planned out.
Whereas, the burning of the museum by the military was a byproduct of the war itself. If it was
intentionally done with artifacts inside and not when the military was retreating, it would have
been more malicious.
Fortunately, Kuwait’s participation in the global arts community contributed to the quick
return of the museum collections. Farah Al Sabah saw the repatriation of objects stolen in the
Kuwait invasion as pivotal in the Kuwait's membership with the United Nations. As Al Sabah
stated, “Kuwait's willing hand to help, and with its peaceful and friendly nature, led the UN's
Security Council to unanimously condemn Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Had
the UN not intervened, especially since Kuwait was assigned to the UN conventions that protect
cultural property, the archives of the Kuwait National Museum, along with other treasures, might
never have been recovered.” 110 International conventions such as "Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property" of 1970 was also signed by both Kuwait and Iraq. Al Sabah believed The Convention
helped cement Iraq's "obligation to reclaim exported cultural property" from Kuwait when it took
the National Museum's archives (among other irreplaceable property) in 1990.111
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A key point according to Oyer is that after the war Kuwaiti representatives came to
Baghdad with a list of only 2,500 objects to be returned, the Iraqis turned over twenty-five
thousand items, "including not just the famous Islamic collection, but also the records of the
Museum and the artifacts and archaeological records of sites such as Failaka.''112 The return of
the collection, which occurred in the fall of 1991, was not reported in the international media
until months later, leading to claims even long after the war's end that the Iraqis had not yet
returned the antiquities.113 This is pivotal in understanding that Iraq did indeed protect the
cultural heritage of Kuwait during the war. This adds to the question of whether the actions of
the SBAH were truly malevolent with the removal of the collection during the invasion;
especially with the amount of documentation put into the collection they removed. The inability
of the Kuwait Museum to recall the records of their stolen collection should be a call for other
museums to develop robust archives. In doing so they can recall and mitigate loss in the event of
theft or destruction to their collections.
Following the invasion, the importance of implementing a modern digitization system of
the collection became clear. As Norman stated, “before the war, neither Dar al-Athar alIslamiyyah nor the National Museum had computerized its documentation of the collections.
This situation was to have profound implications for the recovery program, particularly in the
case of the National Museum. Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah's main archives of documents and
photographs were in Kuwait, but there was a secondary archive in London.”114 Consequently,
this was based on situational irony. This reflects the importance of having multiple digital copies
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of collections in the event of the destruction of collections archives. A lesson that Iraq would
later come to regret not doing. If not for the organized removal of the Kuwait National
Museum’s collection with the records of the objects, the museum would have never known what
it had lost except for the Dar al-Athar al- Islamiyyah collection. This major point emphasizes the
need for a digitized and off-site archive of collections as well as the dangers of improper record
keeping. The motives of the museum being burned is seen as a “scorched earth” military tactic
common of retreating militaries. It could be said that if the SBAH did not remove the collections
and records if could have been a complete loss comparable to Afghanistan’s National Museum a
few years later.

What could have been done?
In looking at everything that has happened with the Iraq looting of the Kuwait National
Museum, it is clear they neglected to prepare for the invasion. According to Kristy Norman,
“although it seems strange in retrospect, in July 1990 most people in Kuwait refused to see an
invasion as a possibility.”115 With that in consideration, if the museum did not foresee a conflict
approaching, there were no contingency plans to put in place in the event something like this
would have taken place. These plans are designed to be implemented at a moment’s notice and
be ready to execute far ahead of time. Planning such as digitizing their collections and housing
them in an offsite location, could have been extremely beneficial in tracking down stolen items.
In hindsight technology to do so was lacking in the early 1990s, but the Dar al-Athar alIslamiyyah collection had done so with most of their collection by having an archive in London,
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U.K. Why the whole collection was not cataloged in a digital database until the mid-2000s (after
the looting of the Iraq Museum) remains unknown.
With regard to understanding types of armed conflict in the Middle East, the invasion and
looting of the Kuwait Museum is one of the most organized, compared to the destruction of other
Museums in this analysis. Saddam Hussein's forces were organized, methodical, and driven by
the acquisition of more historical cultural artifacts from the Middle East. Although what the
Iraqi Army did to the museum itself during its retreat was heinous, it does not reflect the
organization that was used to remove artifacts. It could be said that the attempts of the Iraqi
Antiquities to save a major repository for cultural heritage may be meritorious. Yet, Kuwait and
the UN did not view it that way compared to the other actions his forces did during the war.
Hussein’s defense of the theft was to save the material culture during a time of war from
internal looting. To do so, he cited the provisions from the First Protocol of The Hague
Convention as part of Iraq’s obligation to protect the cultural objects in occupied territory. This
attempt was seen by the international community and the United Nations as a ruse for malicious
antiquities theft. Hussein’s interest in bolstering his legitimacy of power through cultural
heritage contributed to having the best antiquities professionals, facilities, and museums, thus
offering justification to do such a move.
Offering adifferent perspective, Harvey Oyer states in the 1954 Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict - Is It Working - A Case Study:
The Persian Gulf War Experience116, that Iraq protected the heritage of Kuwait during the Gulf
War. He claims that “At first glance, Iraq clearly violated the provisions of The Hague
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Convention that prohibit Contracting Parties from pillaging, vandalizing, or misappropriation of
cultural property. Most western media coverage portrayed Iraqi military forces as calculating
looters who only returned Kuwait's cultural treasures because of U.N. Security Council
mandates."117 More recently, however, a starkly contrasting account of the same events has been
offered by a group of renowned American Mesopotamian scholars. These scholars contend that
“during the Gulf War, the Iraqi Department of Antiquities acted in accordance with The Hague
Convention in its treatment of the Kuwait Museum collection and that the Iraqis should be
commended for their compliance.”118The actions of the retreating Iraqi Army give a differing
perspective as seen by the western media, as they torched the museum at other sites.
This case demonstrates that invasions from a large organized army that can establish a
military presence and secure cultural sites is overall less detrimental to museum collections.
Saddam Hussein had the conviction to attempt to save the collection out of historical relevance
regardless whether it was self-motivated. This is different from other armed conflicts regarding
museums as there was an attempt to save the collection at the beginning of the conflict. Whereas
in other cases, such as with the National Museum of Iraq, the duties of protecting the cultural
heritage of the institution were lacking or not made a priority during a time of war. Another
notable comparison would be during an armed religious conflict. As cultural heritage institutions
are targeted specifically with collections being destroyed based off ideological underpinnings.

Repercussions
Echoes of this conflict heavily implicated Iraq as being the instigator and belligerent of
the conflict with Kuwait. “Until August 1990 Iraqi cultural property and cultural heritage
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resources (its museums, monuments, archives, religious sites and archaeological heritage) were
among the most well managed in the world,”119 though this would dramatically change because
of the repercussions of Desert Storm. This was due in part to the United Nations sanctions
against Iraq and Saddam Hussein's regime. These sanctions have proven to have caused
disastrous consequences on the Iraqi economy and furthermore the state of antiquities which
limited the SBAH of Iraq in securing its cultural heritage. As summarized by the U.S State
Department, “The most significant, and unintended, consequence or outcome during the
aftermath of the Desert Storm campaign arose because of strict UN economic sanctions, which:
(a) caused unemployment and deprivation among Iraqi citizens, causing some to turn to crime;
(b) prevented the Iraqi military from effectively monitoring the south with its vast archaeological
resources, by air; (c) restricted foreign specialists who wished to monitor and guard Iraq's
archaeological sites; and (d) denied Iraqi archaeologists and authorities the basic tools, such as
photographic paper, needed to document and report thefts from archaeological sites and
museums to INTERPOL and law enforcement agencies Worldwide.”120 Even worse after the
war, the Iraqi Department of Antiquities announced that it was prepared to return the Kuwait
collection. UNESCO was unable to act as an intermediary, since the United States and Britain
had vetoed two proposals to send UNESCO specialists and Mesopotamian scholars to assess
cultural damage in the war zone.121 These actions exacerbated the degradation to both countries
cultural heritage sites setting for the further undoing of the cultural heritage of Iraq over the next
10 years.
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In the following years ethnic tensions that were suppressed under Hussein erupted in the
wake of the 2003 U.S invasion that found root in the Desert Storm conflict. During the war,
“Coalition allies encouraged Kurds in the North and Shiites in the South to revolt against the
Saddam Hussein regime: Some of those who did rebel turned their anger on the most immediate
symbol of Saddam's tyranny: government buildings, including local museums. Ultimately,
eleven of the thirteen regional museums across the country were ransacked, and more than 4,000
objects were stolen. Approximately 400 of these objects have been documented and
approximately twenty-four were later identified on the art market.”122 Even years after this war,
degradation of the antiques sector was exacerbated, with U.N sanctions stifling cultural heritage
protection. As stated by the U.S Department of State, “After Desert Storm, Iraq's archaeological
sites were largely unattended; foreign archaeologists were forbidden by UN sanctions from
working in the country and thus forbidden to guard the sites with their presence; the UK and US
had vetoed the sending of a team of UNESCO specialists to assess the situation; even the import
ban of photographic paper needed to document the theft of artifacts from sites and museums and
report those thefts to authorities abroad was banned under UN sanctions; thus, years would pass
before the evidence of theft from Iraqi sites could be recorded and disseminated.”123 These
sanctions in turn established a lawlessness to Iraq when they themselves were invaded thirteen
years later by the United States.
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Iraq National Museum
Between March 19th to mid-April 2003, the United State military launched a major
combat offensive against Iraq and the Saddam Hussein government. The U.S Military under the
command of U.S President George Bush preceded with the invasion on the speculation of the
Iraqi government harboring weapons of mass destruction. The fighting created a power vacuum
and a state of lawlessness in which looting was rampant and the invading U.S forces struggled to
contain. As Bogdanos note: “Among the many targets of the looters was numerous government
buildings including the Iraq museum, home to one of the finest collection of antiquities in the
world.” 124 This instability caused the largest destruction to a museum collection since the
Bosnian and Desert Storm wars. Among many of the other regional museums looted, the
National Museum of Iraq is one of the best archaeological museums in the world, containing the
material evidence for the development of civilized human society from the very beginning of its
history. The subsequent invasion of Iraq and the inability of the U.S military to establish rule of
law as they invaded exacerbated the looting that occurred at the museum. Around 15,000
artifacts, statues, and archives were either destroyed or stolen from the museum in a few days’
time with delayed intervention from the invading U.S government to stop it.

Background
Geographically, Iraq is in what is now ancient Mesopotamia (see figure 1), the low-lying
region between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers where the first city-states developed with the
arrival of the Sumerian culture around 5,000 B.C. “Sumerian farming, writing, legal, and
technological inventions were passed down to and further refined by successive empires in the
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same region, such as the Akkadians, Babylonians, and Assyrians. Because much of this area has
been cultivated and permanently resided on for at least 7,000 consecutive years, the initial
concerns of archaeologists and historians were justifiable.”125 "For millennia, this region has
garnered great interest for its rich provenance in the development of human culture and
civilization.
The country today known as Iraq was a region of the Ottoman Empire until its partition
and disillusion after World War by western countries. It was made up of three provinces, called
vilayets in the Ottoman language: Mosul Vilayet, Baghdad Vilayet, and Basra Vilayet (separated
from Kuwait in 1889). These three provinces were joined into one Kingdom by the British with
the name "State of Iraq".126 The problem with Iraq was that it had no historical, religious, or
ethnic homogeneity. Iraq had no natural capital and no single administrative system or ruling
class. If it was to become a unitary state this would have to be imposed, to some extent against
the wishes and traditions of the inhabitants of each province.127 Then in terms of religion there
was great diversity.
Historically, Iraq has been the leader in the Middle East region regarding cultural heritage
preservation, archeology and well-established museums. This history dates to Iraq's colonial
past and the establishment of antiquities laws that have helped to regulate and initiate a high
functioning cultural sector. In 1918, Sir Percy Cox the Oriental Secretary of Great Britain, asked
Gertrude Bell to consult on the preservation of cultural heritage and she became the Honorary
Director of the Department of Antiquities in 1922, drafting antiquities law. Genna Duplisea
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stated: “She was one of the government’s most eminent scholars on Mesopotamia, attending the
Paris Peace conference in 1919, then the Cairo Conference in 1921, to determine the future of
Mesopotamia. Later that year, she was instrumental in establishing Faisal I as the new state of
Iraq’s monarch. She worked to preserve Iraqi cultural heritage and keep artifacts within the
country as the founder and director of the newly opened Baghdad Museum of Antiquities in
1926 (now the Iraq National Museum).”128
More recently, Bell’s role has been reassessed in the scope of literary theorist Edward
Said’s 1979 work Orientalism.129 In this work he includes Gertrude Bell alongside male
administrators as “Oriental experts all, posted to the Orient as agents of empire, friends of the
Orient, formulators of policy alternatives because of their intimate and expert knowledge of the
Orient and of Orientals.”130 To the British administration, Bell’s knowledge of the Orient and its
peoples made her an acceptable white, educated, upper-class replacement for local knowledge.
Said also argues that Orientalism is a means of “dominating, restructuring, and having authority
over the Orient.” Creating knowledge of a colonized region allowed the British to create policy,
to govern, and to incorporate a new space into a Western system of ideas, measurement, and
understanding.131
In one of the first instances of Iraq’s antiquities laws, Leonard Woolley was stopped from
taking all the extraordinary third-millennium B.C.E. finds from the ancient Sumerian city of Ur 1
for division between the British Museum in London and the University of Pennsylvania Museum

128

Duplisea, Genna. "Writing in the Masculine: Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Gender, and Empire." Terrae
Incognitae 48, no. 1 (2016): 55-75. 64
129
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1979)
130
Ibid, 224.
131
Duplisea, “Writing in the Masculine: Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Gender, and Empire," 63.
58

in Philadelphia.132 Such high functioning rules were developed at the end of British colonial rule
on the onset of the new Iraqi State. “Antiquities laws in place since 1936 vested ownership of
archaeological sites and artifacts in the nation and a vigorous enforcement system protecting a
truly vast archaeological heritage (numbering some 10,000 sites), there was remarkably little
looting of museums or archaeological sites anywhere in Iraq, even during the unrest and
privations caused by the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).”133 This was due in part to the amount of
funding in the latter half of the 20th century that was invested into this sector under Saddam
Hussein's Baathist party. It can be seen that “with a keen understanding of the region's 5,000year history and a cadre of well-trained archaeologists ..working at Iraq's universities, at the
National Museum and at the SBAH - archaeological research in Iraq had continued virtually
uninterrupted from the early 20th century until the 1980s.”134 The present Iraq Museum opened
in 1964, and in 1982, six large galleries were added to the building for a total of 22 galleries, plus
an ample lobby and reception area at the main entrance. This made The Iraq National Museum
one of the most impressive archaeological museums in the world, containing the material
evidence for the development of civilized human society from the very beginning of its history.
This entirely documented collection of finds from the cradle of civilization encapsulates the
essential cornerstones of modern life, including agriculture, writing, laws, mathematics,
astronomy, the arts, and warfare.135
This investment in Iraq’s cultural heritage sector created a highly educated population
that was aware of their heritages worth. In the 1980-1990s, Iraq began to engage with a series of
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wars between the neighboring countries which set the stage for the degradation of the cultural
heritage sector. After the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent coordinated theft of Kuwait's
National Museum, the global community through the United Nations acted against Iraq in the
form of heavy sanctions that led to a severe economic recession. In, “The Looting of the Iraq
Museum in Context”136 , McGuire Gibson states what he thought were underlying causes to the
looting. A major factor Gibson stated that worsened the looting of the Iraq National Museum was
the progression of looting in archaeological sites. This was due to the inability of the Iraqi
government to protect cultural heritage in the years after Gulf War and leading up to the Iraqi
invasion.
Gibson correlated massive looting of archaeological sites in the southern deserts of Iraq
in the 1990s to a vigorous new market for Mesopotamian antiquities that grew throughout the
period before the 2003 war. From this he claimed that a congruence of events had set the stage
for a 1990s boom in illegal antiquities trade and in Iraqi artifacts. Because of a global recession,
Gibson claims that in the late 1980s investors went looking for alternatives to stocks and other
investments. These investments were found in the form of Iraqi antiquities. This interest was
added to by the Moore and Erlenmeyer collections of antiquities, a private collection with
numerous Mesopotamian objects, put up for auction at the same time. As Gibson notes:
“Because they were both old collections, amassed before the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
cultural property, numerous museums, universities, and other institutions that would not
normally have bought antiquities, joined the major collectors in bidding for the items. As a
result, the objects were often bought for unprecedented amounts. Before these sales, cylinder
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seals might fetch a few hundred dollars, with exceptional ones bringing a couple of thousand. In
the Erlenmeyer sale, several seals were purchased for tens of thousands of dollars; three of the
Moore seals sold for over $100,000.”137 Congruently, during the first Gulf War in 1991, nine of
Iraq’s regional museums were looted, putting more than 5,000 items into the illegal market. This
flooded the antiquities market with illegal and legal Mesopotamian and other objects from Iraq's
history with a demand to match.
Gibson138 and Bogdanos139 alluded that an inability of the SBAH to effectively monitor
sites because of UN sanctions on post-Gulf War Iraq. In the years that followed, the Iraqi
government could not control the countryside because of no-fly restrictions in the south of Iraq.
For the first time in more than fifty years looters began to carry out extensive illicit digging on
dozens of sites. Because of the international sanctions, foreign excavators could not continue
work at that time. The SBAH, the agency responsible for all archaeological sites, museums, and
standing monuments in Iraq, had been reduced in its funding, and as a result it had to lay off or
retire many of its employees. The regional inspectors that were left, who would normally have
gone into the desert to inspect sites, were unable to do so because they no longer had
vehicles.140These factors set the stage to what was to come when ultimate lawlessness struck the
country during the U.S invasion of the country.

Timeline of what happened
Due to ongoing tensions, players on both sides of the Iraq Invasion (Both U.S, Iraq, and
the global community) tried to ramp-up efforts to assure the protection of cultural heritage during
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the eve of war. The Cultural Property Training Resource notes: “In January 2003, a delegation of
scholars, museum directors, art collectors and antiquities dealers met with officials at the
Pentagon to discuss the implications of the invasion. They warned that Baghdad 's National
Museum was the single most important site in the country. One member of the delegation,
McGuire Gibson of the University of Chicago, twice returned to the Pentagon to discuss
precautions the Coalition should take.”141The museum itself was then closed in February 2003 on
the auspice of war and to prepare its collections from possible looting.
Later that month The Society for American Archaeology (SAA) wrote to the United
States Secretary of Defense urging protection of antiquities in Iraq.142 During the museum
closure the “staff at Iraq's SBAH prepared for the coming war by transporting moveable artifacts
from the and Heritage and the Iraqi National Museum to safe storage and marking museums
around the country with the blue shield symbol indicating that they were protected under the
terms of the 1954 Hague' Convention.”143
According to Donny George Youkhanna, then director general of the museum, the
SBAH made several decisions intended to safeguard objects during the war. “First, all portable
objects from Mosul, Babylon, and Hatra, including some life-sized statues from Hatra, and some
objects from the other provincial museums, were transferred to the Iraq National Museum.
Second, a group of five persons was given the responsibility of dismantling and hiding the
portable objects from the museum's public galleries in a secret storage location known only to
the five; they swore on the Qur'an not to reveal the secret. Third, sandbags and foam were placed
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in front of or upon some of the large, immovable objects, such as the Assyrian reliefs. Fourth, the
basic object records and many of the most important reference books from the Antiquities
Library were hidden off-site in a bomb shelter, along with almost 40,000 manuscripts from the
Manuscript House. Fifth, the movable shelving of the Antiquities Library was put in the closed
position and welded to make the remaining books and journals less accessible to looters. Sixth,
windows and doors were barricaded with concrete blocks, and the steel doors of store rooms and
doors meant to segregate specific areas were closed and locked. This reviewer wanted to seal all
the outer doors to the museum and the administrative offices of the SBAH but was not allowed
to do so, except for a partial barrier placed behind the museum's front entrance.”144
In hindsight, the museum professionals who dealt with the issue first hand believed “the
actions of the staff of the Iraq Museum and SBAH, in trying to secure the museum by removing
a clear majority of items on public display into a secret storage place… was to a great extent
successful.”145 Bogdanos believes it was “the Ministry of Culture did not give permission to
remove the artifacts from display until three weeks before the war began, the very limited
number [of people] involved in the transfer- just five- were unable to remove all the objects that
were firmly affixed to the walls or that were extremely heavy, and thus the looters were able to
take some of them, including the Warka Vase and the Bassetki Statue.”146
Other items that may have not been safeguarded as well were all the large-scale objects,
such as the Assyrian stone relief slabs and some artifacts affixed to the walls. The SBAH also put
down sandbags in front of the reliefs to lessen the damage if they toppled from bomb blasts.
Unfortunately, due to lack of time and equipment, the staff members doing the removal of
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objects also decided to leave a few very heavy or very fragile items on display, thinking that
looters would be unlikely to move things that heavy. Among the artifacts left on display were the
famous Warka vase, the Bassetki statue base, and the statue of Entemena, all of which were
stolen. It was probably the Bassetki statue base, made of copper and weighing more than 300
pounds, that caused the breaking of every step in the marble staircase as it was dragged from the
mezzanine gallery to the ground floor.”147
In the face of charges that Iraqis did not take enough care of their heritage, and that the
objects would be far better in museums and private collections elsewhere (thus justifying the
illegal market), we can elaborate on a number of issues: The Iraqi antiquities organization did try
to safeguard the objects, which included bringing many of them to Baghdad from outlying
museums, thinking they were safer there. They took almost all portable objects off display and
put them in a secret storeroom. Youkhanna and Gibson wrote: “With more time, staff would
have been able to remove even those, leaving in the public galleries only the massive Assyrian
bulls and slab relief, plus Islamic building facades and giant doors. The major losses were from
the store rooms, whose entry doors were blocked and locked. ”148 As ones BAH official said,
“Already in 1991, we put the most famous items in a vault in the Central Bank and left them
there throughout the 1990s and through the 2003 war. We built walls across doorways and
windows to deter people from entering the museum, and interior walls to hide key doors. The
curators also took the entire contents of the Manuscript House, a separate building several
hundred meters east of the museum and stored them in a bomb shelter in west Baghdad.

147
148

(Youkhanna) and Gibson. “The Looting of the Iraq Museum Complex”, 23.
Youkhanna and Gibson, Preparations at the Iraq Museum in the Lead-Up to War, 31.
64

...Shortly after the war, the museum’s records and the library books were recovered from the
shelter, otherwise the inventory of objects could not have been done at all.”149
Another question raised is why didn’t the SBAH send the collections abroad? This was
proposed by William R. Polk, a Middle East expert, who visited Baghdad before the invasion
and tried to convince Iraqi authorities to send the museum’s collections out of the country for
safekeeping. Given the fact that just the dismantling of the museums public galleries and storing
of most of the displayed items in a secret storeroom took more than two weeks to complete, it is
highly unlikely that museum staff could have emptied the galleries and storerooms in time to
send the collections abroad150according to Youkhanna and Gibson. The main obstacle to this
effort was that “given the reduced staff numbers and the loss of trained museum professionals
because of thirteen years of UN sanctions, it would have been unthinkable to consider such a
course of action in Baghdad.”151 A plan would have already needed to be put in place far ahead
of time in order to execute a coordinated plan such as that.

The Invasion
On March 20th, 2003 the U.S led invasion of Iraq began. A week later March 27th,
UNESCO director, Koïchiro Matsuura, urged United States to protect cultural heritage sites. On
April 5th, almost two weeks after the invasion the first U.S. forces enter Baghdad. Due to the
ongoing fighting by U.S against the Iraqi military, civil authority broke down in the capital. On
April 8, the Iraq National Museum staff fled due to a firefight in front of the museum. During
this firefight a U.S. tank round fired into the reconstructed Assyrian gate at the entrance to the
children’s section of the Iraq National Museum. Attempts to protect the museum were in vain as
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the special police unit charged to protect the museum fled as the battle came closer to the
museum. Neil Brodie believed that had they stayed in position, especially in their uniforms, they
would most probably have been fired upon. Wisely, as they left, they discarded their uniforms
and weapons.152
A few days later April 10th, looting started in museum galleries, store rooms, and offices.
When the looting began, a man who had stayed in his house on the museum’s grounds went out
to the nearby intersection and asked U.S. troops in a tank to drive off the looters. The tank crew,
after conferring with commanders, said they could not do so. By April 12th fighting had
subsided enough for museum staff members who lived in the neighborhood to come in and begin
to secure the building. At the same time, international journalists arrived to document what was
occurring at the museum. The Museum officials pleaded for the U.S. military’s assistance to the
media to prevent further looting. The press reported that looters ransacked the museum archive
computers, burning records that spanned to the early days of archeology in Iraq. At this time the
press also erroneously reported that the same looters stole almost 150,000 items.153
Bogdanos stated that “if journalists were able to get into the museum on the twelfth,
military forces should have been able to do the same on that day or even on the eleventh.”154 He
contended that “Journalists… are generally able to move more freely on the battlefield in order
to report on the conflict”155As the looters fled, a few antiquities employees living nearby came
into the complex and shut the doors. They also hung up a large sign saying that the buildings
were under the control of the Americans, which kept the mob at bay. Although the United States
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finally did send troops to guard the museum on the 16th of April, the basement store rooms were
not entered until after U.S. Marine Colonel Matthew Bogdanos arrived with a team of
investigators on April 21st.”156According to Youkhanna and Gibson, “With almost three full
days of unhindered activity in the antiquities complex, the looters could have taken much more,
had the great majority of them not been more interested in the components of the SBAH
offices.”157

What was lost
There were many issues in trying to address numbers, during the assessment of what was
lost during looting. Initially in 2003, the media that had convened around the museum had
reported 150,000 items lost. This in fact ended being 15,000. Youkhanna had stated that “One of
the major problems with the Iraq National Museum, as with many museums, was the lack of a
complete inventory, including photographs of each item. Yet a very fine master catalogue in
large ledgers, recorded in English and Arabic, has existed since the museum was founded in the
early 1920s; this master could be correlated with excavation find catalogues, and thus the present
location of an item could be discovered from notations on the ledgers and in museum display
case and shelf logs. However, the maintenance of such records was seriously compromised
because of ... layoffs of personnel during the sanction’s regime in the 1990s.”158 Even worse,
Michalowski stated that “the looting of the museum is more tragic because so many of the
objects were still unpublished. Almost everything that was officially excavated in Iraq since the
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twenties of the last century was deposited there.”159 Many artifacts and collections were parts of
major archaeological digs that were cataloged in special ways that correlated with original
excavations. The perpetrators appear to be divided among several distinct groups, each with
different motivations. Some were expressing their anger at the old regime; others were
neighborhood thieves, eager to take furniture, air conditioners or anything they could find;
others- such as those who burned the archives of the Saddam era in the National Library- appear
to have had political or sectarian motivations; some looters, particularly National Archives were
professionals, removing copper wiring, windows, and doors. By all the accounts, the smallest
group of all were the well-organized art thieves who worked methodically, cutting off the heads
of heavy stone statues with special saws stealing only the most valuable works. They apparently
knew what they were stealing. The chief U.S investigator later surmised that professional thieves
at the Iraq Museum during April 10th to 12th,2003, may have been fulfilling "orders" from
international buyers.”160
By compartmentalizing areas, Matthew Bogdanos separated areas of collection theft into
three areas, Public galleries, storage rooms and basement of the museum. As of 2005, about
13,864 or more items are accounted as lost161with about 3,459 items recovered back to the
museum. The worst theft occurred in the basement, and a about 2,307 objects recovered out of
10,686 known objects stolen. The world will probably never know how many items were taken
from the ground floor storeroom, because it had not yet been inventoried.162 As stated in the
article by Donny George Youkhanna The Looting of the Iraq Museum Complex, “Over the past
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seventy years, since the founding of the museum, the museum staff has determined that most
pieces brought back from excavations are not likely ever to be exhibited. Although an item may
be of great importance for archaeologists, since it gives evidence of date or function of a grave or
building, its broken or damaged condition keeps it from being displayed. To take inventory of
this room the museum staff would have to take the original excavators’ records, check them
against the museum’s central register to see which objects had not been given inventory
numbers, and then check each shelf to see what was there. Since the looters smashed many of
things in the storeroom, and since objects, through the years, might have lost their number tags, it
would take a great deal of time and energy to do the inventory, and there would still be numerous
objects that could not be identified.”163
Many of the main artifacts from the museum’s collection that were stolen or destroyed
included; the Sacred Vase of Warka, the mask of Warka and the Golden Harp of Ur,' the
Bassetki Statue, the Lioness Attacking a Nubian ivory, and the twin copper Ninurta Bulls. Also
unaccounted for was the “Treasure of Nimrud”, a spectacular collection of more than 1,000
pieces of gold jewelry and precious stones from the eighth and ninth centuries B.C. that had been
discovered between 1988 and 1990 by Iraqi archaeologist Muzahim Hussein Mahmud during his
excavation of four royal tombs. It is considered by many to be one of the greatest archaeological
finds of the last century. 164

Significance of what was lost
Nationalism, dictatorship, and history go hand in hand in understanding what happened
with the National Museum of Iraq. Two historical epochs on which the Saddam’s Baath party
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focused much of its attention were ancient Mesopotamia and classical Islam. In the case of the
former, the Baath simply ignored the historical inaccuracy of relating the ancient Mesopotamians
to the contemporary Arabs, and radically shifted the period from that of al-jahiliyya
(‘ignorance’) to that of the ‘Arabs before Islam’ .165 According to Benjamin Isaakhan, “The
destruction of Iraq’s cultural heritage has provided fertile ground for simplistic and exclusive
models of identity to be promulgated, creating a rise in ethno-religious sectarianism and
violence. The combination of this absence of an Iraqi national identity and the sharp upsurge in
violence has gone on to have very specific consequences for Iraq’s democracy.”166
The confluence of the political and national regime is shown to instigate the destruction
seen in Iraq after the U.S Invasion. In conjunction with the initial media reports exacerbating the
numbers of stolen items the media coverage ignited immediate outrage. Bogdanos reasoned:
“You'd have go back centuries, to the Mongol invasion of Baghdad in 1258, to find looting on
this scale.”167 Many important artifacts and archives were irrevocably damaged; with prized
items of the Mesopotamian world were destroyed in a few weeks’ time. One of the most notable
artifacts that was destroyed was from the archeological dig conducted by Sir. Leonard Woolley
at the ancient site of Ur. The Golden Harp of Ur was in the middle of conservation when the
invasion happened and was left in the workroom. Another major piece from the museum’s
collection, the Warka Vase, a carved alabaster stone vessel found in the temple complex of the
Sumerian goddess Inanna in the ruins of the ancient city of Uruk, which was completely smashed
off its base during the looting.
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Blame on Looters
Regarding that on the perspective of the U.S military, Bogdanos stated that “Shooting
unarmed looters in civilian clothes who were not presenting a risk for human life would have
been a violation of the law of armed conflict and prosecutable for murder under Article 118 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”168 This justification states that that even if there were
some U.S forces on the ground they could not do anything even if they saw looters. Because of
this Bogdanos concluded that “The blame for the looting must lie squarely on the looters.
Though the blame for creating chaos at the museum from the eight through the eleventh (of
April) that allowed the looting to occur must lie with the Iraqi Army…. After the eleventh
however, the blame shifts to the U.S” 169 Within this defense is the acknowledgement of
practical military tactics during warfare and the rules that need to be followed. In Bogdanos’s
defenses he stated that “The bottom line is that any suggestion that US forces could have done
more than they did to secure the museum before the twelfth is based on wishful thinking or
political ideology rather than on any rational appreciation of military tactics, the reality of the
conflict on the ground, the law of war, or the laws of physics.”170 Bogdanos’s explanation is
understandable yet there it draws the need for involvement of international peacekeepers to help
monitor and protect these sites during conflicts for the benefit of both warring parties. With the
understanding of military tactics, at certain times securing a cultural site is not a practical
priority. Thus, there must be mediator of sorts to protect these sites.
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Figure 9: Broken 4,700-year-old Golden Lyre of Ur destroyed in looting

Figure 10: Warka before and after reconstruction from looting.
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U.S Planning
The most significant outcome of the U.S led invasion of Iraq was the lack of forethought
and action by the U.S military on the cultural heritage of Iraq. Planning and implementation of
protective strategies can be haphazard and slow as demonstrated by what happened to the Iraq
National Museum and other historical sites around Iraq. These actions either directly or
indirectly affected the cultural heritage of Iraq. Many of these infringements resounded the
carelessness that the United States showed towards the material tangible cultural heritage of the
country. Bogdanos believed that “Planners had no idea of the extent to which the average Iraqi
viewed the museum [not as housing priceless cultural heritage of their country, but as Saddam’s
gift shop.] The museum, for example, had been closed for 20 years of the previous 24 -open only
once (on Saddam Hussein's birthday in 2000) and closed again shortly thereafter. As a result,
planners did not understand that many Iraqis would equate stealing from the museum with
stealing from Saddam and not from themselves.”171 This has been in light of many sourced
accounts of the top professionals in the field warning the U.S Pentagon about the dangers that
cultural heritage posed. These warnings echoed the repercussions that occurred after the Kuwait
War and the market of illicit Mesopotamian artifacts that percolated in the wars since.
Professionals such as McGuire Gibson and others repeatedly made efforts to convince
government officials to discuss the ramifications of heritage and conflict if the U.S were to
invade. The United States armed forces were lackadaisical in their efforts to safeguard centers of
cultural importance. Because of this, aspects of the cultural heritage of the nation were
irrevocably lost. The U.S has received heavy scrutiny for their ineffectiveness in the wake of
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numerous attempts to call for protections. The U.S though, has not felt the repercussions for their
negligence from the U.N as stated in the Hague Convention.
These situations, due to bureaucracy and lack of effective oversight, have severely
debilitated, if not ruined, the heart of the cultural heritage sector in Iraq. This type of military
conflict that affected the National Museum of Iraq was neither religious nor militaristic in nature
but reflected the dissent of the people and the meaning the museum held as an extension of
government power. It was a direct result of societal breakdown, lack of law and order,
socioeconomic depression, and the rise of an emerging illicit antiquities market. These factors
should have been used in the consideration by the U.S government in understanding
consideration of the effects the war would have. As Michalowski stated: “The pillaging of the
Baghdad Museum is a tragedy that has no parallel in world history; it is as if the Uffizi, the
Louvre, or all the museums of Washington D.C. had been wiped out in one fell swoop. Some
compare the event to the burning of the Alexandria Library. The full range of losses will
probably never be known because the catalog records were scattered and destroyed and the living
record of more than eight thousand years of human history has been erased in two days.”172

Afghanistan
The National Museum of Afghanistan, a department of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Information and Culture, is the paramount archeology and
ethnography museum in the country. It is tasked with housing and displaying the most important
examples of Afghan cultural heritage while educating local, national, and international audiences
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and advancing the world’s knowledge and appreciation of Afghanistan's remarkable heritage. 173
The director of the museum, Omara Khan Massoudi, has worked at the museum for over thirty
years and has been instrumental in protecting the collections during its tumultuous civil war.
Afghanistan has been entangled in conflict for the last 40 years that has wreaked havoc on the
country's infrastructure and destroyed the country's cultural heritage. At the center of this assault
on the country's cultural heritage and national identity is the National Museum of Afghanistan.
One of the few cultural institutions in the war-ravaged country, the museum as seen the extreme
ups and downs of any national museum in the world. It has been shelled, burned, and had its
remaining contents pulverized by its own theocratic government. This iconoclasm towards the
nations cultural heritage has left what has been found since the from the Taliban in 2001 even
more precious and important to preserve.

Background
Setting the political context of the NMA's creation, Afghanistan had been in a fierce
powerplay over influence between Russia and Britain during most of the 19th century. The two
vied for influence over the country that split their empires known as “The Great Game.” This
political quandary resulted in the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), Second Anglo-Afghan
War (1878–1880), and the Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919).174 During the Second AngloAfghan War Britain was able to assert political influence over Afghanistan. After the death of
King Habibullah Khan in 1919, the Third Anglo-Afghan War was instigated by Afghanistan to
British India. The brief war resulted in an Afghanistan free of British influence and its present
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borders. With a brief rule of Nasrullah Khan, Habibullah Khan’s brother, Amanullah Khan (3rd
son of Habibullah Khan) was able to take the throne from 1919-1929. King Amanullah Khan
was able to pursue an independent foreign policy free from the influence of the British, and his
short rule was marked by dramatic political and social change. He was the first Afghan ruler who
attempted to modernize a very conservative Afghanistan on Western designs.175 This
demonstrated by the western architectural styles of the Darulam building complex including the
Museum and Palace. Afghanistan's National Museum started as a modest collection of artifacts
and manuscripts, described as a "Cabinet of Curiosities,"176 already existed in the time of King
Ḥabibullah. In 1919 an assortment of archival material, regalia, miniatures, and art collected by
the royal family was assembled and housed in the Bāg-e Bālā pavilion on a hillside overlooking
Kabul.177 The move from the palace grounds was meant as a means of “modernization” for
Afghanistan by King Amanullah Khan. The collection moved to a small building within the
grounds of the Royal Palace at Bāgča in 1924.178
A part of King Amanullah Khan’s reforms were the first constitution of Afghanistan and
detailed article was allocated for excavation, preservation and allocation of a locality for
preservation of historical relics of this country in 1922. According to this law, it was ordered that
the branch of “Excavation and Museum” to work under the supervision of Ministry of
Education.179 As the government of Afghanistan had no possibilities and human resources
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necessary for unveiling of historical relics, an accord was signed with the government of France
in this connection. Based on this agreement, the Délégation Archéologique Française en
Afghanistan, heading by Musio Fochet to visit Afghanistan and beside Afghan excavators, he
also worked for unveiling and recognition of historical relics180. In 1931 its holdings were
transferred to the present building in Darulaman, meant to be the new capital, six miles south of
the capital Kabul. This building had previously served as the Municipality, adjacent to the
imposing palace built by King Amanullah in 1923 for the Parliament as part of his vision of a
new European-style city outside the overcrowded walls of Kabul.
After World War II, numerous archaeological missions, including those of the: Italians,
Americans, Japanese, British, Indians, and Soviets, conducted excavations. Agreements with the
Afghan government and the various archeological delegations originally provided for an
equitable division of finds between the foreign institutions and the Kabul Museum. From 1964
on, however, no archeological finds or artifacts could leave Afghanistan.181 The first Afghandirected work was carried out at a Buddhist site at Hadda in eastern Afghanistan in 1965.
Foreign archaeological missions were bound by agreements guaranteeing that all excavated
objects would be deposited with the government of Afghanistan; all artifacts from Afghanistan
where to stay there. In 1966 the Afghan Institute of Archaeology was established in Darulaman
to receive these finds; exceptional items were placed in the museum. A unique feature of the
museum was the fact that more than 90 percent of its exhibits were scientifically excavated
inside Afghanistan.
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The collection of The National Museum of Afghanistan (NMA) is thought to have
housed approximately 200,000 objects at the time of the Soviet invasion in 1978, although no
full inventory of the museum’s holdings had ever been conducted at that time. Some idea of the
museum’s pre-war holdings can be gained from The National Museum of Afghanistan: An
Illustrated Guide182 and from a partial catalog by UNESCO of some of the main artistic objects
in the museum.183 The importance of the museum's collections to history lies within the rich
story of the Asian Steppes and the Silk Road trade. Due to its strategic location, Afghanistan was
closely linked to neighboring regions, and had a significant, though often overlooked, impact on
their historical development. As early as the 5th millennium B.C.E, lapis lazuli from Afghanistan
was traded to Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt.184 This provenance reflected heavily on its
artifacts which it houses from the great Silk Road empires of Bactria and Kushan.

Cultural Destruction in Afghanistan
Politically and socially, Afghanistan has a turbulent history wreaked with instability and
power grabs over the past four decades. In the middle is the cultural identity that The National
Museum of Afghanistan represents, an unintended victim. Rather than one incident, the events at
the NMA can be seen over the course of almost four decades that have affected any previous
attempt to create a cohesive institution. Until 1973, Afghanistan was a kingdom ruled under the
House of Barakzai and then after a bloodless coup became a democracy. In April 1978, the
communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power via a coup d'état
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known as the Saur Revolution, creating an Afghani puppet state until the instability of the USSR
led to withdraw of support to the PDPA.
Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988 and all but the capital of Kabul had
fallen to the resistance, known as the (fractional) mujahideen. During the post-Soviet civil war
from 1988–1996, the museum sat at the front between the territories controlled by rival
mujahideen factions. Over a period of months, the museum was rocketed, shelled, set on fire, and
subjected to frequent raids by looters. When Kabul itself was taken in April 1992, ending the 14year rule of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, mujahideen factions began warring among
themselves for control of the city. Attacks were often launched from the south, and the National
Museum in Darulaman, south of Kabul, was often on the front line.185 During this period, an
estimated 70% of the museum’s collections – approximately 140,000 objects – were looted or
destroyed. In addition to the loss of objects, approximately 90% of the object records in the
museum registry were burned.186 In 1994 the Society for the Preservation of Afghanistan’s
Cultural Heritage (SPACH) was founded in Islamabad, Pakistan, with part of its assistance
efforts going to preparing an inventory of what remained at the Kabul Museum. The society was
organized specifically to address the concern with the preservation of Afghanistan’s cultural
heritage, and one of the few such organizations currently working in Afghanistan. Society for the
Preservation of Afghanistan’s Cultural Heritage has focused its attention on the sphere of
Afghanistan’s material heritage, advocating for the role that this particular facet of the national
identity can play in peace, development and nation-building. SPACH has been predominantly
active in the areas of supporting the National Museum of Afghanistan and preserving its
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collections, advocacy and awareness-raising with regard to the plight of cultural heritage in
Afghanistan in general and in relation to specific sites of cultural significance, and in field
surveys and emergency conservation works on endangered monuments and sites. 187
From 1993 to 1998, the Museum staff labored under extremely difficult, even dangerous,
circumstances. Darulaman as well as Kabul suffered daily rocketing and shelling. In May of
1993 the museum was struck by a rocket and then in March of 1994, the building caught on
fire.188 A pivotal point for the museum was when the Taliban gained control of Kabul and most
of the country on September 27th, 1996. Until then members of SPACH where able with some
safety work on what was left of the collection. Through the efforts of Carla Grissman, an attempt
was made in-mid-1996 to conduct another preliminary inventory of the remaining objects of the
National Museum and to facilitate a plan to have them removed to more secure premises. Due to
the obvious lack of security at Darulaman, the Ministry of Information and Culture of President
Rabbani’s Government was also anxious to safeguard what remained of the collection. Thus, the
objects were packed up and the Kabul Hotel in the center of the city was chosen as a temporary
site to house them along with 71 National Museum staff members. From April to September
1996, just two weeks before the arrival of the Taliban in Kabul, over 500 crates, trunks and
boxes, containing 3,311 objects were shifted from the Museum to the Kabul Hotel. The project
was ultimately successful but was hampered all the way by continued hostilities.189 The
collection made it safely, with no damage done to the collection or harm to the staff.
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Figure 11: Pottery and debris from National Museum of Afghanistan 1993

Figure 12: Burned archive labels from Afghanistan National Museum
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During this time, there was relative stability for the collection being removed from the
dangerous conditions of the museum. In June (1999) a Taliban decree was issued in Kandahar
by Mullah Mohammed Omar protecting all cultural and historic relics of Afghanistan and
making excavations and smuggling of artifacts out of Afghanistan illegal and punishable by law.
On another earlier promising note, the Taliban was also renovating the Kabul Museum, and even
opened it for a month in the summer of 2000 until it was shuttered by hard-liners scandalized by
the "idols" on display.190 Yet it has been described that the death knell for Afghanistan’s
heritage was ultimately being sounded not just by hardline Taliban, but by the increasingly
influential al-Qaeda forces in the country who bankrolled the Taliban.191 A year later the largest
threat was yet to come, systematic cultural heritage cleansing by the state government, the
Taliban.
In February 2001, the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar issued an edict ordering
the destruction of the Buddhas claiming they were idols and objects of worship:
“On the basis of consultations between the religious leaders of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
religious judgments of the ulema and rulings of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, all statues and non-Islamic shrines located in different parts of the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan must be destroyed. These statues have been and remain shrines of unbelievers and
these unbelievers continue to worship and respect them. God almighty is the only real shrine and
all fake idols must be destroyed.”192
As stated by Romey, Afghan nationalism, reflected in the stone monuments and elaborate
sculptures going back thousands of years, was getting in the way.193Later that same month, the
Taliban also destroyed large numbers of statues in the National Museum of Afghanistan,
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including masterpieces of Gandharan art from the 2nd–4th century C.E., the Buddhist monastery
complex of Hadda (these are some of the earliest depictions of the Buddha), along with statues of
the Kushan emperor Kanishka, and 19th century carved wooden funerary and religious
sculptures from the Nuristan region (formerly Kafiristan) in eastern Afghanistan 194 This
antipode of cultural policy is a reflection of the Taliban’s harsh interpretation of Islamic Sharia
law and the resulting conflict that cultural heritage has against their viewpoint. These attitudes
exacerbated issues with the NMA collections until the U.S, in late 2001, establishing stability
and reconstruction to Afghanistan's cultural heritage sector. A major problem with protecting
cultural heritage in the country is that Afghanistan is not a party to the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, and it therefore cannot avail itself of this process. 195 This resulted in the inability of
the U.N. to work with Afghanistan in helping promote and protect their heritage through funding
and assistance. After attempts to rejoin the global community, Afghanistan became a Party to the
1970 UNESCO Convention in September 2005, giving it the protection that the convention
provides.196

Timeline of what happened
Many attempts have been made to gauge figures on the status of the National Museum of
Afghanistan's collections when fighting had subsided or cooperation between warring parties had
allowed. The first attempt was in the early 1990s although there were only estimations
previously. This first assessments about the status of the NMA was described by Nancy Hatch-
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Dupree in an article for Archeology Magazine in 1996 titled "Museum Under Siege." In the
article Hatch-Dupree stated:
“About 70 percent of the museum's collections are now missing. Most of its vast gold and
silver coin collection, which spanned the nation's history from the Achaemenids in the sixth
century B.C. through the Islamic period, has been looted. Also gone is a Greco- Bactrian hoard of
more than 600 coins from Kunduz, in northern Afghanistan, dating to the third and second
centuries B.C, including the largest Greek coins ever discovered. Pieces of Buddhist stucco a schist
relief dating between the first and third centuries A.D. and Hindu marble statuary from the seventh
and ninth century have been taken, as have carved ivories in classic Indian styles from Begram,
site of the summer capital old the Kushan Empire in the early centuries A.D. Also missing are
many of the museums’ prized examples of renowned metalwork of Ghaznavids, whose sumptuous
capital flourished 90 miles southwest of Kabul during the tenth and eleventh centuries.197
Her article gave a startling glimpse into the horror that had fallen onto the museum
during the Afghan Civil war. This account gives an example of a window of opportunity that
Hatch- Dupree and organizations such as SPACH could attempt to save the museum. The next
set of reports on Afghanistan would come in 2001 with the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas
and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S.
After stabilization of the country after the fall of the Taliban, more assessments have
come out about the state of the museum that reflect the importance of Hatch Dupree’s earlier
evaluation. A before and after can be given through the papers of Carla Grissman and Gil Stein.
This research confirms and disseminates rumors on what happened to the museum and clarify
what was really lost. It was found that at least 70 percent of everything once housed in the Kabul
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Museum vanished or was destroyed. Although we should be grateful for the remaining 22,607
items (mostly small beads and spangles from a single archaeological dig)198 Many of the more
important items such as the Bactrian gold horde and ivory’s from Tillya Tepe were hidden
during the conflict and were found later after stabilization commenced.

Significance of what was lost
The significance of what was thought to be lost was not realized until the stabilization of
much of country in 2001. Most of the objects that were left at the museum before the civil war
were destroyed with little record to tell what was lost. Between the partial burning of the
museum and then the attacks by the Taliban, what was left of the collection can be considered a
total loss. What was found after the U.S invasion of the country brought out hope of renewal in
national identity through its liberated cultural heritage. Many of the most important items were
hidden by pre-civil war government officials to try to protect the collections from looting and
destruction. These items were hidden in government vaults or safe spaces within the country and
were thought to be lost during the war. Carla Grissman stated that the collection of the NMA was
important because “every object in its possession came from Afghanistan and excavated from
Afghan soil. Collections spanned fifty millenniums, from the Middle Paleolithic, Neolithic,
Bronze Age, Achaemenid, Bactrian, Indo-Greek, Great Kushan, Kushano-Sasanian and Hindu
Shahi through to the Islamic and ethnographic present time. Accidental finds accounted for
several important collections, including the Ashoka Edicts from Kandahar, objects from Tepe
Fullol, Tepe Khazana, Serai Khoja, Hindu Shahi pieces from Tagao and Gardez and the famous
Kunduz, Chaman-i-Houzuri, Tepe Maranjan and Mir Zakah coin hoards. ”199 These collections
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therefore offer a unique viewpoint of history of the Asian steppes and of how different cultures
blend, especially eastern and western cultures. Not only material artifacts have been lost but also
a unique repository of knowledge about a distinctive civilization blending eastern Asian and
Mediterranean influences that developed along the old trade routes that cross the country. For
example, the early Greco-Afghan kingdoms that arose in the region after the breakup of the
empire of Alexander the Great around the middle of the third century B.C. produced an
extraordinary culturally Greek city known now as Ay Khanum, near the northeastern finger of
Afghanistan that reaches toward China.200 Items that were thought to be lost from these empires
where reclaimed after the liberation and stabilization of Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004. In 2003,
a section of the Central Bank vault in the Presidential Palace was cleaned out to make room for
quantities of newly printed currency. Crates were shifted, revealing tin trunks and seven safes
holding the precious collections missing from the museum. A government press release was
issued announcing that the trunks of artifacts from the Kabul Museum deposited in 1989 were
intact.201
These hidden stockpiles contained many treasures including: ivories, bronzes, ceramics,
marble and glass treasures from Begram. The more than 100 ivories catalogued included the
leogryph console, the three standing yakshas, the largest examples of ancient carved ivory in the
world, and dozens of incised panels, carved openwork plaques and friezes. All the Hellenistic
bronzes were intact, as was all the gold jewelry. The glassware included the Pharos of
Alexandria, the millefiori bowl, blue glass vases and bowls, the dolphin flasks and the painted
goblets. All the alabaster and porphyry vessels that were on display were intact. Among the
Greek plaster emblems was the Head of a Poet, Eros Holding Psyche as a Butterfly, Aphrodite
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And Ganymede. Thirteen of the 14 ceramics were found intact, including the blue-green glazed
pottery vessel in the shape of a bird woman. Also, from the vault emerged over one hundred
objects from Hadda, numerous large figures from Fondukistan, the giant footprint of the Buddha
and the Buddha head from Kama Dakka, the Qol-i-Nader reliquary, many terracotta heads from
Tepe Khazana and the unique rhyton from Kona Masjid in the shape of ram’s horns holding a
smiling male head with snail curls between the horns. Also intact was the gilded silver Cybele
plaque from Ai Khanum, the fragments of gold vessels from 2500 B.C. Tepe Fullol, the gold belt
buckle from Surkh Kotal, the fifteenth millennium B.C. limestone head from Aq Kupruk, the
oldest sculptured specimen found in Asia, and the second millennium B.C. bone seal with
winged camel. Over a thousand gold coins and over 300 silver coins, including the Bactrian
double decadrachm as issued by King Amyntas ca. 120 B.C., the largest Greek coins ever
discovered, were intact. New trunks were bought, and all objects were repacked and deposited
again in the vault.202 These items survived most of the extreme travesties of the ten-year war to
be found, unscathed. Out of the items found in 2004 from the Presidential Palace, the Central
Bank and the Museum, the team catalogued the 71 entire Tillya Tepe collection of 20,457 items
on 453 datasheets. Not the smallest appliqué was missing. New safes were bought, and the
Bactrian Gold was repacked and again deposited in the vault.203 This was done for the collections
safekeeping as the country was still rocked by instability.

What could have been done
Preventative measures for protecting the museums relates to the lack of development in
the cultural heritage sector and the overall degradation of the country due to civil war. From this
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point professionals need to work on developing the museum and antiquities field within the
country as well as emergency procedures for museums and archaeological sites.
According to Remsen and Tedesco, the challenges facing those engaged in heritage
preservation in Afghanistan include the following; the large quantity and dispersed nature of
cultural heritage sites; the lack of site identification, documentation or research; the difficulties in
prioritizing needs and developing hierarchy of interventions; the inaccessibility of many sites,
often far from roads and in rugged terrain; the country's harsh climate, which limits intervention
schedules; the generally poor condition of most of most historic monuments that make work
difficult, slow and expensive; the absence of local infrastructure to support interventions; and the
lack of a qualified local workforce to manage or carry out conservation work…. The practical
realities have significantly limited the scope and scale of the opportunities for foreign donors and
their local implementers to carry out cultural preservation work.204
With ongoing conflicts happening in Afghanistan since the 1970s, the question of why or
how this happened to the museum cannot be easily explained as in other conflicts. One of the
primary causes that sets the groundwork for undermining cultural heritage is instability.
Instability, whether it is political, social, or financial caused many of the problems. In the case of
Afghanistan, it was a mixture of political and social instability with financial reasons seldom
being a reason that protection could not be made. Politically, the instability led during the fall of
the Soviet backed government into civil war, left the museum without the support of its
government. When a government cannot take care of its constituents, sectors such as cultural
heritage, are neglected in the void of civil authority. During the period of the civil war and the
Taliban regime, the collection was either neglected, separated, or stolen. Socially, the meaning of
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the museum was ignored and when some form of stability occurred, the museum was targeted by
the theocratic government. As noted by Patty Gerstenblith: "Lawlessness, lack of centralized
civil authority, and economic poverty are now the accepted recipe for cultural heritage
destruction the shortcomings of the current legal regime, particularly the looting of unexcavated
archaeological sites. This is the most devastating type of cultural loss-not only are objects lost to
history, but the contexts in which those objects were embedded are also permanently lost.205 It
can be concluded that if the Taliban stayed in power after 2001, there would be very few
remnants of Afghanistan's historical material culture left. These conclusions are shown in the
toxic relationship between the Taliban government and al-Qaeda that had already started to slip
into extreme religious fundamentalism. Yet another factoring question could be made about the
museum’s collections, was why wasn’t it removed from the country?
There has been a stigma surrounding the motives regarding the attempts of removal of
cultural heritage to global safe havens. Museum officials and scholars say that despite repeated
Afghan requests that priceless treasures be safeguarded over the last 20 years -- during the
decade-long Soviet occupation, and then amid civil war and fierce Islamic radicalism -- virtually
none were officially removed, although pieces have been regularly smuggled out for sale.206 The
collection’s survival owed much to the quiet efforts of museum personnel in 1988, when the
decision was made to move the most important artefacts. More than 200 crates and boxes of
artefacts were moved from the museum, on the outskirts of Kabul, downtown for storage in the
Ministry building. The most valuable pieces, including the Bactrian Gold, a collection of over
20,000 items from 2,000-year-old burial mounds, had already been stored in the presidential
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palace compound.207 Another attempt was by then President Mohammad Najibullah in 1991 to
have the Swiss Bibliotheca Afghanica Museum take the Tillya Tepe treasure excavated in 1979
out of the country. Though, the Afghan government couldn't reach a consensus and the collection
was not moved. Again, another attempt was made during the civil war period between 19921996 by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the then military leader of the Northern Alliance defending
Kabul from the Taliban. Massoud was equally reluctant to move objects, including the Tillya
Tepe treasure, out of the country when he held power in Kabul between 1992 and 1996, but gave
his full support to the Bibliotheca Afghanica after being ousted by the Taliban. In the last
interview before his assassination in September 2001, Massoud told Newsweek that he regretted
the fact he didn't move the contents of the Kabul Museum to a "safer place" when he had the
chance.208 On the same occasion, UNESCO, Western archaeologists and SPACH also opposed
the removal of artifacts as well.209 One of the founders, Nancy Hatch Dupree, said “There’s A lot
of fury in hindsight and it's easy to pontificate on principles' in Paris or London when you have
no idea of the realities on the ground. But the reality isn't that simple, for the basic fact is that
cultural heritage is inevitably bonded to national honor." According to Dupree, SPACH had also
explored the option of removing museum collections to a safer area, but while many Afghan
officials enthusiastically endorsed the idea, those at the top often demurred, saying that it would
make them look weak and unable to protect their cultural heritage.210 These occasions given to
protect and save the National Museum’s collections faltered to pride and stigmas that resulted to
its demise.
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These apprehensions even stem to UNESCO’s policies of intervention because of the
abuses of western powers during wartime. Over the last century, especially as colonial empires
were collapsing, an overriding principle was embraced by many archaeologists and enshrined in
international conventions and the policies of organizations like UNESCO. This principle was
that artifacts should never be removed from a country, however poor or unstable it might be.
Across Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean, governments and citizens campaigned to bring
pillaged art back home.211 This damage of state sponsored looting has put a stain on cultural
heritage protection in times of war. In U.N., in Shift, Moves to Save Art for Afghans, reflects the
outcry about the state of Afghanistan's cultural heritage problem after the destruction of the
Buddhas. The article states that in UNESCO’s experience, museums had been skittish about
accepting works for safekeeping, especially institutions in Pakistan and France, which have been
the targets of campaigns to return art already in their collections.212
In the same interview Paul Bucherer, the founder of the Bibliotheca Afghanica, stated:
“By the time UNESCO established official guidelines with the Afghanistan Museum in July
2001, there was hardly anything left" in the country.213 In the interview Bucherer pulled out a
photograph of a storeroom in the basement of the Ministry of Information and Culture in Kabul.
He stated, "Here's 18 cubic feet of primarily Gandharan and Bactrian artifacts from the Kabul
Museum, in pieces no bigger than my little finger. The Taliban came in the morning, hammered
until prayer time, paused, hammered again, paused for tea, then hammered for the rest of the day.
Afghan Taliban refused to do the job, so Mullah Omar sent in foreigners - Arabs, Chechens,
Sudanese - to blow them up.” 214 Juliette van Krieken-Pieters felt that the Afghans as such did
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not want their Buddhas to be destroyed. They formed part of their personal history, at least for
the people that were aware of their existence. One must keep in mind that even Mullah Omar
issued decrees in 1999 to emphasize the importance of the Buddhas.215What was left of the
community “knew what the future held” and tried to send items to the Afghanistan museum in
Bubendorf Switzerland with no avail. Even if I had their agreement, I now doubt whether the
Afghans would have managed to bypass al-Qaeda [and get the materials out]. But at the time
"Rabbani, the recognized president of Afghanistan, gave written permission in May 2000 to
bring the materials here to Bubendorf and this was not acceptable to UNESCO. The president of
a country is responsible for the belongings of his nation, and if his request is not accepted, I do
not know what else can be done."216 These statements reflect the effectiveness of what the
global community entrusts as its cultural protector, UNESCO. When cultural heritage is
sacrificed, it is likely that many other aspects of life that mark us as human beings are also being
sacrificed. It is our obligation to preserve cultural heritage as the inheritance of future
generations and because future generations depend on us to do so.217
In an alternative perspective to this, Finbarr Flood believed that the destruction of
cultural heritage was a result of defiance to international community. Flood stated that “By
destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas and the National Museum Statues the Taliban acknowledged
the symbolic and political significance of this cultural heritage. The Taliban intended to
eliminate the physical record and the historical memory of the pre-Islamic past for ideological
iconoclastic reasons but also as a statement of political defiance toward the international
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community who vociferously opposed its actions and its poor civil rights record”218 Political and
iconoclastic the motives of destroying cultural heritage in Afghanistan centered on reinventing
their theocratic regime into a national identity. Flood notes: “Similarly, Taliban iconoclasm can
be understood as constituting a form of protest against exclusion from an international
community in which the de facto hegemony of the elite nations is obscured by the rhetoric of
universal values.”219 In addition he added, “an index of an idea of community that frequently
falls far short of the ideal (and nowhere more so than in Afghanistan, where superpowers did
battle by proxy), there could be few better targets to make the point”220 Thus the damage done to
the country's cultural heritage and its main repository, the National Museum, has been
irrevocably destroyed. The ongoing regional instability of Afghanistan has further added to that
by the inability to safeguard, monitor and protect the museums corresponding cultural sites. To
help prevent these atrocities organizations have tried to help implement plans to preserve and
protect Afghan heritage.
In looking to the future, the US-National Museum of Afghanistan Partnership was
conceived as a joint venture between an American cultural institution and the national Museum
to address some of the pressing and practical needs identified in the conservation assessment.
Remsen and Tedesco stated that after an open competition, the Oriental Institute of the University
of Chicago, a leading cultural heritage and archaeological institutions, was selected to carry out
the Museum Partnership activities. The United States has committed US $2.77 million for this
project.221 The museum partnership has three primary aims:
1) The establishment of a new museum electronic catalog and collections management
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system, with remote data backups to avoid the fate of the museums past paper microfiche
inventories and catalog.
2) The complete digital inventing, documentation and archival rehousing of the museum’s
collections to better protect the objects in their current storage locations and to facilitate
future relocation to a new museum building, and
3) Practical, sustainable, capacity- building training in museum management, museum
practice and operations for museum staff in Kabul
The National Museum of Afghanistan has been and remains a symbol of national unity in
a country with great ethnic and political divisions. It faces profound present and future
challenges, including significant practical and operational difficulties and real curatorial and
exhibition design questions in the future.222 With further investment and the cultivation of
interest of the National Museum of Afghanistan and the afghan culture can we never see
something like this happen again.
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Chapter 5: Current Threats
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
The threats to museums in the middle east reached new heights in 2011 with the rise of a
new extremist group in Iraq and Syria. This is a result of an extremist version of iconoclasm
propagated by the jihadist militant group, ISIS. This paradigm in Islamic thought towards
imagery transcends previous historical incidents of iconoclasm including times of previous wars.
The goal of these wars was cultural and ethnic cleansing and to perpetuate their Salafi ideology.
Tragically, thousands of years of heritage has been destroyed in less than a couple of years due to
this fighting. Their root causes laid in religious extremism against material historical culture base
off fundamentalist Islamic teachings. Between 2014-2016 they attacked and destroyed numerous
sites in a purposeful way that resulted in the complete loss of cultural and museum collections. In
doing this they completed one of the most destructive forms of armed conflict to a cultural
heritage site. This terrorist group has initiated a radical agenda during the Syrian civil war and
the ongoing instability of the Republic of Iraq by forcefully taking over local governments. The
ramifications of their destruction include displacement of the largest group of people since
World War II and a campaign of destruction of hundreds of cultural heritage sites that date to the
dawn of human civilization.
Thee destructive acts conducted by ISIS have greatly overshadowed previous damage
done to cultural heritage sites. An account for the group’s actions can be shown using ISIS’s
origins and comparing it with the first two jihadist waves of the 1980s and 1990s. ISIS was born
of an unholy union between an Iraq-based al-Qaeda and the defeated Iraqi Baathist regime of
Saddam Hussein. Coming from an environment of destructive war led to extreme religious
fundamentalism fueled by religious ideology. This school of Islamic religious thought is part of
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an ideological offshoot of Wahhabism. It is a very conservative Sunni School that has many
branches including, Salafi fundamentalism which ISIS is a part of. Salafi jihadists take the holy
book of Islam, the Quran, and very literal interpretations of Sharia law. This conservative
approach stems from the Taliban's interpretations of Islamic rule. Its origins root in al-Qaeda's
localized mission in Iraq that was led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was killed by Americans
in 2006. Since Saddam Hussein’s fall and the 2003 U.S Invasion in Iraq, nominal groups led by
al-Qaeda have waged sectarian war against the Shia's. This warfare evolved into fighting against
other religious minorities and the Iraqi government as the conflict progressed. The Sunni sect of
Islam is the largest Muslim sect in the world and was often disenfranchised by Saddam's Baathist
party and the later Iraqi government.
In Syria, the rise of this organization is contributed to the civil war in the country led by
the Shia leader President Bashar al-Assad and the disenfranchisement with his people. The Sunni
cries of inequality in Syria fell on deaf ears when it appealed to western governments leading its
isolation and extremism in some of its adherents. These raw feelings led to the amassing
thousands of embittered Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis to fight under ISIS's banner, even though many
do not subscribe to its extremist Islamist ideology.223 The broken social systems of Iraq and other
Middle Eastern countries produced a fraying and illegitimacy to state institutions which ISIS
thrived on. ISIS who is currently led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has recruited and
accomplished more than Osama bin Laden's twenty-year movement being head of al-Qaeda.
This organization is also backed up by its vast funding which comes from sources such as
smuggling, extortion, and the oil wealth of the region. The group has relied in recent years of
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funding and manpower from international recruits with the sources of this funding often coming
from the looting and theft of cultural heritage sites and museums.224
From early 2014 up until late 2017, ISIS held large swaths of area converging on eastern
Syria and North Iraq. During this occupation, the group conducted rampant widespread
destruction of cultural heritage sites and museums in the areas they controlled. These actions
were used as propaganda for their movement and heavily publicized on various forms of social
media such as YouTube. Their actions provoked global outrage by the destruction of cultural
sites using various tools and improvised weapons. In late February 2014 a video surfaced
showing ISIS militants pulverizing ancient artifacts in a Mosul museum after the city was
taken.225 The propaganda video shows them topping over statuary as well as smashing anything
left in the museum. Before the attacks in late 2013, 1,700 out of the 2,200 artifacts that make up
the museum collection, were transferred to Baghdad for safekeeping and because there was
maintenance work in [the] museum building.226 This construction luckily prevented what could
have been predicted as complete destruction of the museum’s collection as evidence to what they
did to the few immovable objects that remained.
In another instance in March 2015 ISIS purged the historical site of Nimrud Iraq, capital
of the Assyrian empire, which was founded more than 3,300 years ago. Its frescoe’s and sacred
texts were celebrated around the world for being well preserved and were a major tourist
attraction in Northern Iraq. The destruction documented by ISIS, used sledgehammers and
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jackhammers to break down alabaster reliefs before bulldozing the mud brick enclosure. They
blew up the site with large barrels of ammunition, which was about a mile and half large
settlement. Documenting their destruction, they posted a video of it as propaganda, it's one of the
worst spectacles of ISIS’s cultural destruction. The propaganda used praise to describe the
destruction by eradicating heretical gods to make way for their conservative view of Islam.
The archeological complex at Palmyra received notable attention when it was captured in
May 2015 by ISIS forces and quickly was used for its propaganda. The amphitheater at its site
was host to public executions, one of which the beheading of a leading figure, archaeologist to
the site Khaled al-Asaad. Using satellite imagery and videos posted by the group at the time,
sites of the complex such as Valley of Tombs, Baalshamin Temple and the 2,000-year-old
market complex where blown up. When Syrian government forces recaptured the area, there was
little to nothing left of many of the major sites. This also happened with Hatra in Iraq. In March
2015 ISIS attacked the 2,000-year-old city of Hatra, one of the first capitals of the first Arab
Kingdom. Video shows ISIS sledge hammering off the faces of wall statuary using bulldozers
and explosives to destroy the archeological site before leveling it. In connection to the
destruction at the Mosul Museum, most of the immovable artifacts destroyed there were from the
Hatra site. After this region was recaptured, there was little to nothing left of the physical site.
Other targets include sects within Islam as well as other minority ethnic and religious group’s
cultural heritage sites. ISIS continues to destroy multiple cultural heritages of this ancient region
by demolishing historic churches, synagogues, mosques, Sufi and Shia shrines, and other major
archaeological sites.227 These provocative and heinous displays of destruction to cultural sites
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have those in the field of antiquities and archeology aghast to the destructive power and path of
ISIS.
With the loss of almost ninety eight percent of territory once claimed by the jihadist
group across Iraq and Syria, Iraq's government announced that its war against ISIS was over in
December of 2017, almost four years after the group first seized parts of the country.
Unfortunately, this conflict wiped out thousands of years of history in a short amount of time
while the conflict was watched from afar by the international community. This begs the question:
how can this be prevented, and if it cannot be prevented, what can museum and cultural heritage
professionals do to minimize or mitigate damage? The answer lies within being able to predict
and initiate defensive strategies for museums and heritage sites through extensive planning.

What are the implications of these situations?
In the case studies affecting museums and cultural heritage sites in the Middle Eastover
the last 30 years, the theme of social upheaval is a predominant if not the sole factor that
exacerbated the destructive circumstances. This theme is the unifying factor that resulted in
damage to cultural heritage, specifically museums. The outcomes of social upheaval have
resulted in progressive tensions of social, ethnic and sectarian violence that have plagued the
region. The reasons of these breakdowns are reflected in the evolution of ethnic identity over
nationalism to religious sectarian violence. This has created a far-reaching destabilizing effect on
Middle Eastern countries among Sunnis, Shias, and minorities. Acts of destruction towards
cultural heritage are displayed by early examples in the case studies as retaliatory actions of
iconoclasm towards a nationalist identity that was viewed as oppressive. This causes the isolation
and the dissolution of nationalism fueled by religious and ideological tensions which contribute
to sectarian violence. The sectarian violence creates armed militant jihadists that have been
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driven by radical Islamic teachings. Conservative sects like ISIS and al Qaeda target museums
and other cultural heritage sites with the purpose of eradicating heritage in place of their own
ideologies. These brief explanations result in conflict with almost all aspects of society that result
in destabilization that threatens museums.

Pragmatic approach
Though ISIS and the Taliban are often labeled as terrorist groups, they have successfully
created sophisticated states. As Audrey Kurth Cronin stated, “Terrorist networks, such as al
Qaeda, generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold
territory, and cannot directly confront military forces. ISIS, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria,
maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands
infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. If ISIS is purely and
simply anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army.”228 This conclusion develops
the notion of what they are doing to cultural heritage of the region is a part of “nation building”.
This is done by developing a new sense of national identity by expunging perceived harmful
aspects of it. Nation building is defined by: “Creating a country that works out of one that does
not - because the old order has collapsed (as in the former Soviet Union), or been destroyed by
war (Iraq), or never really functioned in the first place (Afghanistan). To transform a failed
country can involve establishing order through the rule of law and creating legitimate
government and other effective social institutions, as well as a credible currency and a
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functioning market economy.”229 The by-product of these steps is extremist ideologies
perpetuated by the destruction of cultural heritage by ISIS and the Taliban. The public displays
of smashing ancient Assyrian “idols” in Mosul and Nineveh by ISIS and the destruction of the
collection at the National Museum are testaments to this. These nation building steps can be
attributed in conjunction to the themes of Iconoclash. Attacks on aspects of nationalism, such as
cultural heritage, to establish a new identity are inevitable. This is even more true when there are
deep ethnic, religious or political divisions in the population or the country has no history of ever
functioning effectively. 230
The practicalities of running a pseudo government such as Taliban and ISIS have
established governments in the areas they control and need revenue. Besides instituting religious
propaganda against cultural heritage, they are practical in knowing what cultural heritages worth
is. Thus, items that are not destroyed in displays of propaganda can be sold to benefit the
organization. The Taliban and ISIS have various ways of income and many cultural heritage
items can fetch large sums of money and be a good revenue for funding. “Islamic State or Isis
did not start the looting. They came across a pre-existing situation and institutionalized it. At first
there was a casual arrangement to loot whereby Isis applied an obscure Islamic tax of 20 per cent
payable to the ‘State Treasury’ but since the beginning of 2015 this has been formalized. You
now have to have a license issued by an ‘archaeological administration’ office with punishments
if you are caught digging an area where you are not allowed.”231Afghanistan also had laws such
as these at one point in place. Organization of antiquities such as in ISIS controlled areas and the
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Taliban’s Afghanistan reflect the need to control assets such as cultural heritage that can used to
support a regime, even if it is to sell them.
Another problem that was found in both cases of Iraq and Afghanistan was that of looting
by everyday people and clandestine art dealers. As Amir Al-Azm stated was “subsistence looting
by displaced people many of whom are on the brink of starvation”232 also contributes to theft in
both cultural heritage institutions as well as archaeological sites. Conflicts can have many
negative effects for the everyday person and when they are drawn out, they can be even worse.
Looting, as in the case of the Iraq and Afghanistan, can be a result of desperation to sell items as
well. The market is ripe for middle eastern antiquities even if values could be as little as ten to
twenty percent of what the same objects with legal provenance could fetch.233 These thieves and
often the people they work for and sell too, are even harder to find. As Richard George stated
smuggler sand attempts to fight them, are already a long way down the supply chain from the
actual looting of antiquities.234 Though the needs of these looters of archaeological sites and
museums are far from being quenched. The immediate demands of the extreme privation
suffered by many Syrians (and others) are likely to outweigh such long-term considerations. The
antiquities looting crisis in the Middle East - one aspect of the region's broader cultural heritage
destruction disaster - will probably persist at least until the wars in Syria and Iraq are brought to
an end.235
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Chapter 6: Lessons from Case Studies
Analyzing the incidents of extreme cultural heritage destruction to national museums of
countries during conflicts; an assessment can be made on what went wrong and how to prevent
further loss. Each of the instances of cultural heritage destruction share the same theme of armed
conflict and negligence towards protecting heritage. These faults contribute to the further loss of
collections through absence of national government, high illegal demand for artifacts, lack of
international interventions, religious iconoclasm. Because of these factors, disaster planning
attempts faltered, and heritage was lost. By addressing these common flaws in that have affected
conflicts in the Middle East region can the promotion of effective disaster planning and
mitigation be implemented to other museums in the region.

Absence of National Government
A major contributor to the losses at museums demonstrated in the cases where the
absence of a preventative measures to guard collections and sites. As what happens in wars,
governments have limited capacity to ensure the protection of its cultural treasures resulting in
their loss. In Kuwait and Iraq, the governments of these countries were under attack or became
non-functioning because of this conflict. Thus, the inability to safely execute and protect
museums and collections is thwarted. In Kuwait's conflict, The Gulf War, it took several days
before the Iraq came to the Kuwait National Museum and systematically packed the entirely of
the collection under the auspices of protecting cultural heritage during war time. There was no
security or attempts to protect the museum because of lack of planning on the museums part as
well as absence of a government protection force for the museum. Thus, Saddam could go and
take the contents of the museum without any conflict or objection.
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In Iraq in the U.S led invasion, the U.S government was quick to neutralize the Iraqi
government and military. Comparatively, the U.S. government was abnormally slow in securing
cultural sites taking up to six days to secure the national museum. Meanwhile the museum was
raided, looted, and many items were lost while the museum was left unattended. The museum
had guards that protected the grounds but, they were a part of the Iraqi military and thus fled as
U.S forces inundated Baghdad during the war. The absence of government contributed in the
inability to protect the museum as well as the inability of the U.S led coalition to establish law as
they invaded and protect cultural sites.
In the example of Afghanistan, the general instability that began when the country
erupted in civil war in 1992. The instability and absence of a legitimate government contributed
to the lawlessness that wrecked the country for almost five years. Because of this the museum
and its collection was left vulnerable to war and fighting with little protection. Attempts made to
help the collection and the museum by the former government President Mohammad Najibullah
to have items sent away to Switzerland where thwarted. As a backup plan, he implemented plans
of hiding many of the gold treasures in safes. While other attempts were made by SPACH, the
only viable attempt made by the Afghan government to secure the museum was after the Taliban
gained control and implemented a ban of the sale of archeological items. This attempt is
duplicitous, as the collection was destroyed later by government officials in the following year.

High Illegal Demand
Another concerning trend that primarily affects the Iraq and Afghanistan museums was
the illicit market of Middle Eastern artifacts. Many objects that were stolen were done for sale on
the black market. Because of the reasons the art market was ripe for conflict induced looting. In
Iraq, everyday people knew the value of its nation's treasures do to the heavy investment into the
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heritage sector and due to economic decline, it was eventually taken advantage of. The effects of
this led to looting and thievery on an unprecedented level as Iraq felt the sanctions of the U.N.
When the U.S destabilized the nation during the Iraq War, another antagonist surfaced, dissenters
of the Saddam Iraqi government. They combined with the looters of the museum to target and
destroyed what they saw was oppression in the form of a government institution. Objects from
the museum where meant to fetch high prices on the illegal markets and to the everyday person
who decided to loot, they ended up returning the items they stole after the U.S military secured
the museum.
In Afghanistan it can be seen starkly different. Many of the prized objects such as the
Bactrian gold and ivory panel carvings had been hidden away at the start of the civil war were
forgotten and thought to be lost. Afghanistan's main collections had been tucked away and what
was left in the museum was eventually lost with the museum. The museum was burned, shelled,
and left without electricity for multiple years before assessments could be made to it. When they
were made it was found that many objects that survived were stolen. A collection of Buddha
statues housed by the museum were decapitated and later found in the markets of Pakistan and
China. These objects were destroyed because of the ineffectiveness of moving large statues for
the looters.
In comparison there wasn't as large market for the items in Afghanistan as there was for
Iraq though many items made it onto the market via Pakistan. In the case of Kuwait, the Iraqi
government was the sole beneficiaries of the looting in a hypothesized attempt to add to their
collections. Saddam Hussein relied on the power history to legitimize his regime and did so in
the Gulf War by confiscating the entirety of the Kuwait National Museum. Rather than selling
the items, Hussain intended to add them into the government collection of Iraq. If allowed to do
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so, many of Kuwait's national treasures and that of the private Sabah collection would have been
incorporated into the SBAH Collection of Iraq. The contentious question of whether Iraq stole
the Kuwait National Museums collection or acted to protected is debatable.

Lack of International Intervention
In Iraq, the stabilization of cultural heritage sites during the Iraq War was the main
instance in lack of international intervention. The U.S failed to secure the National Museum as
well as other cultural and archeological sites that led to looting and damage. As the aggressors,
the U.S neglected to protect the cultural heritage of a nation they were destabilizing as they
attempted to overthrow the government. If the U.S made an immediate presence, the damage to
the National Museum and other state buildings would have not been as bad as it ended up being.
They lacked implementation plans to safeguard cultural heritage even though it was heavily
advised to do so. Because of this poor planning the outcomes to many cultural heritage sites of
Iraq had poor outcomes many objects still lost or stolen.
In Kuwait, the Iraq military did try to protect the cultural heritage of Kuwait by putting
armed guards at the museum within days. Even if Saddam's actions were considered heinous in
the theft of the collection, there is evidence that he did try to secure and protect the collection. If
he did not secure the collection the retreating Iraqi army could have set the museum ablaze with
the entirety of the collection inside. This factor can be argued that Hussein's actions did benefit
the collection. In one of the most detrimental insistences of lack of intervention was the case of
the National Museum of Afghanistan. There it took more than 12 years for any type of major
intervention to be made to the collection at the museum. These hostilities impact negatively on
the social and economic stability of communities and the ability of government and non-
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governmental organizations to deliver development projects to those regions.236Attempts as early
as the late 1980s were made to send the collection away as civil war loomed. Yet there is a
stigma against evacuating collections out of a state in conflict due to the many atrocities that
other western countries have made in the name of this. Thus, attempts from SPACH to antiTaliban leader Ahmad Shah Massoud to UNESCO'S first attempt where in vain because of
stigmas and lack of action between individuals and the global community.
International agencies such as the United Nations, UNESCO, and other NGOs, often
lobbied the governments of the countries urging protection with no avail. These organizations are
weak in their actions in these three cases, with involvement causing problematic implications
especially with the case of Kuwait. The United Nations sanctions along with dominant players in
the organization such as the U.S. imposed harsh sanctions that all but Iraq and the SBAH after
the Gulf War. These sanctions then set the stage for what happened in Iraq in 2003. In other
situations, like Afghanistan, too little was done too late. By the time that UNESCO attempted to
save the Afghan National Museum there was nothing left at the time due to Taliban imposed
ethnocide. In analyzing the role of these NGOs, they lack force in the face of destruction of
cultural heritage with their actions in these cases being bureaucratic and lacking real
effectiveness. Without imposing a harder approach to prevention and combating cultural heritage
destruction the U.N and UNESCO are useless in these extreme situations.

Religious Iconoclasm and effects on the region
In one major instance, religious Iconoclasm contributed to the negative actions towards a
museum’s collections. After the Afghan civil war and consolidation of power, the Taliban
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became more and more aligned with a strict school of Islam, Wahhabism. This coincided with
the relationship the theocratic Taliban government held with the terrorist group al Qaeda. Stated
previously, the Taliban government allowed progress to begin again at the National Museum of
Afghanistan and even went so far as to declare antiques theft against the law. Though those
positions drastically changed especially in 2001 as they began to destroy historical sites such as
the Bamiyan Buddhas and other historical sites. This correlated in an extremely hostile situation
for cultural heritage in Afghanistan because of the extreme stance on iconoclasm. This issue with
religious fundamentalism is a major point to be considered in understanding threats to museums
in the Middle East region. Although only touched upon in the Afghanistan case study, this has
been a rampant problem challenging museum in the Middle East in the last ten years. These
religious fueled tensions towards national and cultural identity are at the forefront of an attempt
at ethnocide based on religion. Without combating the wave of extremism and the
disenfranchisement of people’s nationalistic identity, this wave will continue to threaten cultural
heritage.
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Chapter 7: Practical Planning
Preparation is imperative to maximizing the chances of survival of cultural heritage in
worst case scenarios. Although many museum professionals find it unfathomable for their
collections to be destroyed or stolen, it remains a real possibility. As said by McGuire Gibson
and Donny George Youkhanna, “It is essential that all museums administrators everywhere think
of worst-case scenarios. Any museum could be the victim of looting in times of social unrest,
especially given the current elevated prices for antiques and works of art. Museums should have
a contingency plans to remove artifacts for safekeeping- perhaps even outside their countries,
and if practical at least in storerooms that are better constructed that is currently standard in the
near east and elsewhere.”237 The atrocities that have been occurring in the Middle East to
museums should be the rallying point for museums around the world to develop cohesive
disaster mitigation plans to alleviate possible damage. If not, the next time more priceless objects
will be lost forever.
Every museum no matter how small, should have a disaster plan that is ready to
implement at any time. Focusing on preparation, the assessment of the danger should be put in
on focus to determine the appropriate plan. As mentioned earlier, the type of threat is the largest
indicator of the extent of what will happen, especially when dealing with armed conflicts within
the Middle East. After recent incidents of destruction of cultural heritage in Mali and Syria, the
United Nation established guidelines to reinforce the need for cultural heritage to be protected
from destruction and looting. The U.N details key action protocols at the international, national,
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and specifically protocols during armed conflicts.238 In Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013),
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015) aimed to prevent
illicit trafficking of cultural properties from, within, or into conflict areas. This creates a problem
for non-actors of these established protocols which leaves action plans ineffective and not
preventative for every situation.
The establishment of key risk management planning lies in educating and providing
funding for the development of museum preparedness plans within the Middle East. These plans
need to reflect the current threats to museums and corresponding cultural heritage sites. By
assessing the threat, either Armed Conflict or Religious conflict can professionals and
governments prepare effectively for hazards that may endanger collections and sites. As shown
by the preparedness model presented, different risks have different outcomes and learning from
the past is key. In development of an implementation plan, two key sources of heritage
emergency plans have influenced the development of a proposed plan that is focused on
addressing the original threat. ICCROM’s emergency plan Endangered Heritage: Emergency
Evacuation of Heritage239 collections and Be Prepared: Guidelines for small museums for
writing a Disaster Preparedness plan 240have been based as model for their proposed strategies.

Problems
A major problem is addressing the needs of museums during threats, that are applicable
to all museums regardless of size, location, or financial status. As stated in Heritage for Peace,
“cultural heritage institutions should develop a strategy for the protection of cultural heritage in
238
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the event of an armed conflict.”241 However, all too often solutions are sought from developed
countries to address problems in developing countries. The guiding principle in the development
of risk management plans should undoubtedly be that local problems need local solutions.”242
These solutions need to address the threats that have plagued the region over the last 30 years on
a local level. Taking these lessons learned, especially with the rise of new threats through
religious armed conflicts caused by ISIS, sectarian violence, and civil wars, create a cohesive
action plan. By focusing on assessing threats, museums need an established plan to be able to
anticipate multiyear conflicts and prepare for these conflicts especially in long term situations
such as with the Afghanistan civil war or the ongoing Syrian civil war. This allows flexibility of
plans to shift with unanticipated variables in all the cases presented. Addressing safe spaces for
collections during long term conflicts or political situations need to always be an option for
museums with major threats. As Juliette van Krieken-Pieters wrote, “Many people in the legal,
archaeological or museum field are opposed to or have mixed feelings when it comes to the
concept of a ‘safe haven’. Their main concern lies in the fact that there are always those who will
use it as an excuse for misuse.”243 The practice of hiding collections throughout the country in
conflict cannot be relied upon either even though it has worked in previous situations. If it
became known, or was assumed to be general practice, that museum pieces are concealed on site,
determined exploiters (local or foreign), pillaging troops (authorized or not) and vengeful
military forces, seemingly authorized to destroy enemy culture, would go straight to any known
secure point to look for such pieces.244 Social instability, corruption and opportunism often get in
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the way of these plans as well. As Beiraghi stated, recent conflict situations confirm that during
socio-political crises where the population opposes governments, heritage resources encounter
some major threats: “Public ignorance about heritage values and protection of heritage
properties; instability of regimes, making protection of heritage properties less important in
comparison with political issues; People’s intention to show their opposition to their
governments by looting museums and destroying heritage properties that they think belong to
regimes and not to them; Limitations of international bodies like UNESCO, ICOMOS
(International Council on Monuments and Sites), ICCROM and similar institutions, during the
crisis when their national committees cannot act properly because of instability of the country or
due to their structure which is considered unreliable by the regimes.”245 To step up this global
initiative Col. Matthew Bogdanos stated “ UNESCO ought to convince its member nations to
support such an initiative. It is time that the UN seize the mantle of international leadership and
convince its members to support such a plan. As our best hope, UNESCO ought to step into the
vacuum of international leadership, seize the bully pulpit and become relevant again.”246 Without
this governing mediator in atrocities to cultural heritage nothing will be accomplished in time to
save heritage. A more specific problem that poses a hindrance to other war-torn countries, is that
of Afghanistan. According to Cassar and Rodríguez-García, there seems to have been a distinct
lack of political will to address a range of important and urgent issues affecting cultural heritage.
Rather than using the new-found freedoms and political support that characterized the immediate
post-Taliban era to play an active role in protecting cultural heritage, and promoting the values
that this embodies, the government seems to have lapsed into treating such heritage as an
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instrument of its political goals, rather than as a source of diversity and inspiration that in fact
belongs to all the women and men of the country. In 2006, Afghans find themselves in a
situation that seems in many ways to differ little from their cultural experiences under previous
regimes, which used the symbols of cultural heritage in crude official attempts to bolster a sense
of national identity.247 This reflects the lack of prioritization of cultural heritage and the probable
stagnation to the future efforts in the country. Cassar and Rodríguez-García continues this note in
that failing to rise to this opportunity, far from being more effective than its predecessors, the
government will continue to imperil the surviving cultural heritage of Afghanistan, while
effectively marginalizing itself in the eyes of a dynamic new generation of Afghans.
Handicapped by a lack of vision and policy direction, arguably the government’s next greatest
challenge is an acute lack of capacity.248

Professional Organizations
A plan with different contingencies must be put in place before conflicts arise to
maximize the effectiveness of outcomes. Museums within the Middle East must focus on a plan
that is specifically geared to armed conflict and have it well prepared before any conflict arises.
The basis of risk preparedness should be raising public awareness. It is also important to
organize social actions among heritage professionals instead of governmental measures, because
depending on the nation, there may not be enough resources or interest in developing
preparedness plans and through professional organizations it is more likely to happen. In this
case, Beiraghi stated that a group of experts could act effectively because: they can be involved
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within public activities and try to raise public awareness in protection of cultural heritage. Due to
their profession, they can carry out risk assessments and evaluate them in order to implement the
best means of protection. They are familiar with, or may be members of, international
organizations in protection of cultural properties.
Therefore, they (experts) can inform those organizations about critical conditions and act
for them in an efficient and practical process. 249 Organizing these professions is key in
developing these plans because they can often work off of each other using knowledge of what
works. Thus, museums and professionals do not have to be reliant on their government and can
strengthen connections with other museums. An example of an organized professional group
working in the auspices of war would be SPACH’s efforts in Afghanistan. One of the great
strengths of SPACH as an organization has been the preparedness of its personnel to work and
travel inside Afghanistan to assess the potential threats at first hand, and the implications and
limitations of policies and theories when witnessed at the practical level of implementation, even
when security could not be assured. In this manner SPACH has been able to keep abreast of
developments and threats to monuments and sites across the country as they unfolded and
continue to unfold, and to advocate for policy change and action when
necessary.250Organizations such as these bridge the gap when government organizations cannot
or because of diplomatic reasons, will not.
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Digitization
Digitization of the whole museum collection is one of the most important preparation
actions that need to be completed in a timely and organized fashion. This is key in assessing
what the museum has and what it must lose. “In areas of special vulnerability, such as the Middle
East, database management programs need to be approached as emergency situations, with
resources directed for the rapid creation of museum catalogs.”251 This can be seen as a major
fault in the cases of Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan where complete and digitized documentation
was lost due to physical copies or partial digital copies left on site and were victims to the
museums destruction along with the collections. This step is key in the easy organization of
collections to know what they have, portable, and if stolen can be quickly accounted for. This
permit sending information to trafficking watch dogs such as INTERPOL and fine art auction
houses. Documentation is essential in identifying a cohesive collection as well as bringing old
and new objects together. This was a major shortcoming in the NMA’s collections where all the
collection’s information cards were lost or extremely damaged when the museum burned. This
left professionals unable to determine what was lost or what was even in the collection. Another
example of this fault would be in Kuwait where only the Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah collection’s
records was sent to another location and not the entire museum inventory. For cohesiveness, Iraq
had many small archeological items that had not been touched or cataloged since their
excavations in the 1920s. This disarray caused many of the oldest items to have lost their
provenance due to being unorganized and identified in a cohesive catalog. To add to the
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problem, many, if not all the computers, collection and administration files were lost due to
looting and the resulting destruction. This made it even harder to track down stolen items.
With digitization of collection items, it also preserves the images of the items in case of
their untimely loss or destruction during conflict. Having a digital image and documentation of
an item that is lost is far better than having broken pieces and a half-burnt ID card for an item.
Digitizing and establishing remote servers are thus an imperative for not just Middle Eastern
museums to establish but all museums. Another very important aspect for this plan is for the
digitized copies to be stored in a separate location in the event of something happening to the
museum where they may be lost. This proved extremely beneficial for the Kuwait National
Museum’s Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah collection during the Gulf War by the keeping of a copy
of the collection in London U.K. Another key benefit of this offshoring of digitized collections
is it prevents invading parties from tampering. With many collections being digitized it is easy
for hacking to make items disappear. This hypothetical notion is key to be considered in this
century as many computerized systems can be hacked especially is a belligerent party wants to
steal an item and thus make it disappear from records. This can make theft very easy for thieves
to steal and hide what they have done. Cloud storage could be the key to help prevent this and
has been used more and more for practical uses. Cloud storage is a model of computer data
storage in which the digital data is stored in logical pools. The physical storage spans multiple
servers (sometimes in multiple location) leaving it less susceptible to thing such as power
outages or destruction of server sites.

Twinning
A suggestive step in preparing a museum in any conflict is establishment of developing
connections and agreements with other institutions abroad. Called twining or Sister Cities. This
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route is meant to establish collections with another institute or city for mutual relationships.
During a time of conflict, the sister institution can work with that institution and have established
relocation procedures. This is beneficial during times of need, because if too many groups try to
help fragmentation of assistance can lead to duplicated efforts and a loss of information. To
prevent this, heritage institutions in danger could link up with one foreign heritage partner only.
This idea has already been put into practice by the American Association of Museum and has
also been suggested by the Middle East Librarians Association.252 This process also
destigmatizes sending collections away to other countries that may not give back materials when
conflicts end. The stigma of sending collections away during threats of war or long drawn out
conflict was one of the reasons for why the National Museum of Afghanistan collection was
always on the move and never left the country. The need for twinning is key to saving collections
by safekeeping in long term conflicts. It also gives reassurance that the collection will be
returned.
As stated by Heritage for Peace, “collaborations of this sort are actually advantageous to
both parties. The institution at risk only must deal with one foreign partner, which is simpler and
provides a direct point of contact. Their counterpart will get to know the institution at risk better
and will be able to readjust their plans as they go along, targeting their assistance appropriately
and seeing their money better spent. However, it can be more than a just a practical solution.” An
example of such partnership is Kabul which has sister city agreements with Ankara and Istanbul,
Turkey; Delhi India and Omaha, Nebraska. Others include Kuwait City’s partnership with
Mexico City as well as Baghdad’s relationship with Beirut. Cultivation of these international
ties can sow the seeds of disaster prevention by establishing contingency plans for evacuation of
252
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collections in dire situations that threaten not just the museum’s cultural heritage, but the country
itself. This can be seen with the invasion of ISIS forces into Northern Iraq taking key strategic
cities such as Mosul, or the damage done to Palmyra.
By having a clear plan that can be fulfilled by both agreeing parties, cultural heritage and
museum collections can be safely taken away and stored until the conflict is resolved. Without
these types of partnerships, there will be further serious damage to cultural heritage. International
cooperation is imperative in these cases to successfully evacuate collections from either a failing
state, state ordered cultural cleansing or total war. Situations seen in Afghanistan should be taken
as a call to develop new regulations to help in this struggle, yet there are none.

Trained Cultural Police
In the event of a threat to culture, whether it is a war or the inability of a government to
protect cultural heritage, there needs to be an international arm dedicated to solely protecting
Cultural sites. These “cultural police” would work to protect museums and archaeological sites
from looting by securing sites with armed personnel. These armed personnel would ensure that
looting of cultural heritage would not occur in times of war; they would also work to track down
stolen objects and persecute those who stole. The goal of these special forces would be in the
mitigation of damage to cultural sites as well as educating military personal in proper protection
as well. To make this happen there is need for an international body such as the U.N to establish
this and require its members to mitigate the situations. “Yet, the UN has never trained guards for
the (cultural) sites. Even the UN’s cultural arm, UNESCO has failed to act, claiming it has no
such mandate from its member nations,” 253 because of this there is only willing participation in
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the 1954 Hague treaties rather than cooperative enforcement. One group that Lawrence
Rothschild recommended as a model in a speech The Italian Carabinieri Department for the
Protection of Cultural Heritage, a division of the Italian National Police.254 This organization
supports international police cooperation via INTERPOL and UNESCO to stop the illicit
trafficking of cultural property and has also carried out support activities during peacekeeping
operations (as in Iraq between 2003 and 2006). The Italian Carabinieri Department for the
Protection of Cultural Heritage department works in close cooperation with UNESCO and
represents an international reference for many countries that seek to improve their policies and
procedures for countering illicit trafficking of cultural objects. Twenty-six countries from all
over the world have benefited from training courses for their police forces and customs agents.255
Modeling a force based on this organization is key in fighting the destruction of cultural heritage.
The U.N needs to entrust the establishment of this group to UNESCO and be able to send group
members to conflicts as they arise around the world. With an established force by UNESCO
modeled off the Carabinieri there can be some hope.
Until this plan is put forth, the conflicting armies and leaders must also plan for any
actions for the protection of cultural property in the proposed areas of operations. This protection
must go beyond merely putting the site on a no-strike list or Blue Shield designation. Blue Shield
International, formerly the International Committee of the Blue Shield, is an international
organization founded in 1996 to protect the world's cultural heritage from threats such as armed
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conflict and natural disasters.256 It must include the securing of significant sites and immediate
deployment if needed, of on-call security forces upon reports of looting. Where such forces
already exist, U.S. forces should assist by providing
them with vehicles, radios, and training. Where no
forces exist, the U.S military must protect the sites
until trained forces are available. 257 Because of this
Gibson and Youkhanna believe that such preparation
would enable planners to identify shortfalls and where appropriate- attempt to fill such needs from
international organizations or coalition countries
before the conflict.”258 Investment into museum
planning whether it is developing a plan, digitizing
collections, or implementing agreements for safe
Figure 13: Blue Shield

sanctuary is key, but without funding and training can
be easily fail. Global agencies such as ICCROM,

UNESCO and the U.N need to step up funding for developing programs and implement them on
a mass scale for institutions at risk and those with little funding to do so themselves.
Preparedness should not need a catastrophic incident to occur in order to have plans.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
The facts presented lead to a conclusion that there are numerous, complex reasons why
museums and the cultural heritage sectors in the Middle East have been targeted in heinous
attacks and destruction. The complexities of the socio-political and religious tensions in the
region have brought down the foundations of the region's history to a point of serious irrevocable
losses. Professionals and governments must institute preventive measures and attempt to predict
conflict related damage to cultural heritage and be ready to initiate plans. Furthermore, these
plans must be assessed to address individual threats and the needs of each museum.
Generalization of planning cannot be used to solve all cultural heritage problems and must be
addressed on a local level. These three case studies show each region shares the common theme
of British imperialism, and the lack of attention given to ethnic and religious problems spurred
the issues. By acknowledging these preexisting problems, the keepers of cultural heritage may
prepare themselves and aid in the process of healing after the conflicts are over.
For without this planning and implementation besides U.N security resolutions, it will
continue to happen. As Cassar and Rodríguez-García said,” In a fragmented society, valuing
cultural heritage can be important to boost the consciousness of national unity, bridging ethnic
and social divisions, and firmly rooting the country of its glorious past. By educating the young
in the rich and diverse material heritage left as a trace by the different civilizations that inhabited
the land in the past, we will ensure that a new generation … is made aware of the values of
cultural diversity, so important to build peace in a post-conflict country.259
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